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Abstract 
Cape Breton Island provides a clear case of economic expansion, contraction, and 
diversification throughout the last half of the 20th century. During this time, both the 
Government of Canada and the Government of Nova Scotia used Crown Corporations 
(state own enterprises) to implement a series of policies to promote economic 
development in a climate of growing unemployment with declining resource-based 
industries. 
There has been uncertainty as to whether Crown Corporations have helped or 
hindered the diversification of Cape Breton's economy. Some Crown Corporation where 
better at this task, while others provided limited benefits to the economy and squandered 
critical government funds with no return on investment. Using various theories on 
regional economic development, the role of Industrial Estates Limited, the Cape Breton 
Development Corporation, the Sydney Steel Corporation, and Enterprise Cape Breton 
Corporation is examined. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
Crown Corporations are but one of many policy instruments a government can 
use to promote regional economic development. This enquiry examines the use of Crown 
Corporations to promote economic development on Cape Breton Island. This paper 
contends that Crown Corporations have both succeeded and failed in diversifying the 
economy of Cape Breton Island. By determining whether employment was created, ifthe 
jobs remained for a lengthy period of time, and whether the Crown Corporations 
achieved the objectives they were assigned will determine whether the Crown 
Corporations succeeded or failed in diversifying the economy. 
Four Crown Corporations were selected for this study to determine whether they 
succeeded or failed in contributing to the diversification·ofthe Cape Breton economy. 
Each had an overall goal of fostering economic development even though their mandates 
were quite different. Industrial Estates Limited (IEL) was mandated to diversify the 
economy of Nova Scotia through the sponsoring of industrial parks and industrial 
infrastructure construction. The Cape Breton Development Corporation (Devco) was set 
up to phase out Cape Breton coal production and take the necessary steps to develop 
replacement industries. The Sydney Steel Corporation (Sysco) was established to keep a 
steel plant operating to prevent certain economic catastrophe if it were to close. 
Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation (ECBC) was given broad powers to develop the 
Cape Breton economy and assumed the responsibilities of other economic development 
organizations. IEL and Sysco were provincial government Crown Corporations, whereas 
Devco and ECBC were federal government Crown Corporations. 
Crown Corporations are defined as being corporations in which the government 
has a controlling interest and which provide goods or services directly to the public on a 
commercial or quasi-commercial basis.1 It is when policy instruments like taxation, 
spending, and regulation put a legal limitation on the outcome of the desired policy 
objective, or when a requirement to minimize political liability exists, that governments 
tum to Crown Corporations for solutions.2 
There are several alleged benefits for the use of Crown Corporations. When 
multiple policy objectives need to be coordinated, such as was the case with Devco, a 
Crown Corporation can provide the structure and cost benefits needed for success. 3 The 
structure of an industrial sector will also be a deciding factor whether a Crown 
Corporation should be involved, particularly if there is an absence or presence of a 
competitive market, or whether other policy instruments will support a private sector 
industry.4 The establishment of a Crown Corporation also implies symbolism to a 
community, telling people that the government is committed to a particular cause or set 
of values; thereby building confidence in the community.5 Community development, 
nation and province building activities also lie in the realm of Crown Corporations, as do 
income stability, economic transition, and the security ofsupply.6 These suitable 
situations will be demonstrated in this study. 
1 M.J. Trebilcock, R.S. Prichard, D.G. Hartle, D.N. Dewees, eds. The Choice ofGoverning 
Instrument (Ottawa: Minister of Supply and Services Canada, 1982), 74. 
2 Ibid., 79. 
3 Ibid., 77. 
4 1bid., 77. 
5 1bid., 79. 
6 1bid., 83. 
2 
Crown Corporations demonstrate other advantages as well. According to 
Trebilcock et al., Crown Corporations set out to maximize policy objectives in addition 
to, or in spite of, profits.' For instance, the Canadian Broadcasting Corporation (CBC) 
provides radio and television services and content. This could be provided by the private 
sector, but the CBC provides uniquely Canadian content and acts as an instrument of 
national unity by showing Canada to Canadians, in spite of profits in some of its business 
units. It is the taxpayers who cover the losses a Crown Corporation incurs in light of the 
policy objectives pursued. This feature permits Crown Corporations to adopt a social 
conscience in communities where community commitment policy objectives are being 
exercised. 8 Crown Corporations also provide a degree of separation from their political 
masters, in contrast to departments and agencies. Whereas ministerial accountability 
comes into play with ministers directly responsible for a department of government, 
ministers can effectively employ selective responsibility through Crown Corporations, 
distancing themselves where there is a negative political return, and take credit when the 
outcome is positive. Similarly, if ministers want to be perceived as reducing the size of 
government, off loading some responsibilities of a government department into a Crown 
Corporation provides that symbolic perception.9 
On Cape Breton Island, Crown Corporations were employed by the federal and 
provincial governments to foster economic development (see Appendix A). Economic 
7 Elaine Kirsch, Crown Corporations as Instruments of Public Policy: A Legal and Institutional 
Perspective (Ottawa: privately printed, 1985), 5. 
8 Brett Fairbairn, Balancing Act: Crown Corporations in a Successful Economy (Centre for the 
Study of Co-operatives, University of Saskatchewan, 1997), 13. 
9 Trebilcock et al. 82. 
3 
development is the raising of the general level of welfare by creating new jobs where 
man-year productivity is above the national average. 10 No single regional economic 
development theory can explain the entire situation in Cape Breton, but when combined 
with each other, and with Crown Corporations, an intricate picture emerges. These 
theories have affected the policies that have driven the Crown Corporations towards their 
various economic development goals. Geographic theories like growth poles and staples 
theory may compliment each other, but exclude external factors of influence presented in 
neo-Marxist theory. 
Geographic economic development theories come into play on Cape Breton 
Island. The idea of growth poles (or growth centres) holds that some small and medium-
sized cities can serve and act as a source and diffuser of innovation. Growth poles are a 
source of dynamism in the economy and generate spin off benefits outside of the pole, 
but not necessarily in the same local geographical region as the growth pole. 11 If this 
theory were applied to Cape Breton, it would be found that the Cape Breton Regional 
Municipality (the area from Sydney Mines to Glace Bay) is the dominant growth pole for 
the island. The Strait of Canso area (Mulgrave, Port Hawkesbury, Point Tupper) can be 
considered another growth pole. When the federal government's Department of Regional 
Economic Expansion was practicing growth pole theory in the 1970s, it decided to 
designate Halifax and the Strait of Canso as growth poles. The Sydney area, where 
10 Benjamin Higgins and Donald J. Savoie, Regional Development Theories & Their Application 
(New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1995), 22. 
11 Benjamin Higgins and Donald J. Savoie, "Conclusions," in Regional Economic Development: 
Essays in honour of Fran9ois Pe"oux, eds. Benjamin Higgins and Donald J. Savoie (Institut canadien de 
recherche sur le developpement regional, 1988), 379. 
4 
unemployment was rampant and new investment desirable, was excluded.12 It must also 
be remembered that any new industry just simply cannot be told where to start up so 
government can create a growth pole. Some rationale needs to be involved to determine 
the new economic engine to be established and to manage the supporting industries and 
services for this economic development engine. 13 
Another geographical theory of regional economic development that has 
implications for Cape Breton is the staples theory. There are a few variants on staples 
theory. Harold Innis uses staples to explain the history of Canada's economic, political 
and social institutions. In this case, however, W. A Mackintosh's staples approach to 
economic development through exports is employed. 14 According to this theory, 
development is tied to the production and export of staples based on a region's natural· 
resources. Underdevelopment, as a result, is based on a failure to exploit a region's 
resources within the limits established by geographic and technological factors. 15 Cape 
Breton certainly has been a staples-based economy, relying on coal mining, fishing, 
farming, forestry, and primary steel production to provide a livelihood. Regions that lead 
under the expansion of natural resource exploitation will eventually lag as the natural 
resources decline. Regions without vast natural resources need to concentrate on human 
12 James P. Bickerton, Nova Scotia, Ottawa, and the Politics of Regional Development, The State 
and Economic Life (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 243. 
13 Benjamin Higgins, "Francois Perroux," in Regional Economic Development: Essays in honour 
of Fran~ois Perroux, eds. Benjamin Higgins and Donald J. Savoie, {lnstitut canadien de recherche sur 1e 
deve1oppement regional, 1988), 46. 
14 W. T. Easterbrook and M. H. Watkins, Approaches to Canadian Economic History, {Toronto, 
1967), X. 
15 Henry Veltmeyer, "The Capitalist Underdevelopment of Atlantic Canada," in 
Underdevelopment and social movements in Atlantic Canada, eds. Robert J. Brym and R. James Sacouman 
(New Hogtown Press, 1979), 17. 
5 
resource development. This means that technical, managerial, scientific, and 
entrepreneurial skills need to be developed.16 In areas where the private sector does not 
invest in the human resources available, the state must step in to prime the pump. Having 
people who want to work is not enough; they have to be trained, educated, and skilled. 17 
Geographical theories may be a simple explanation for regional disparities, but 
the culture of a people will also factor into the regional economic development 
equation.18 The Maritime Provinces have been described as having a regional 
parochialism and conservatism that has resulted in a lack of entrepreneurship, initiative, 
and a resistance to change.19 For places like Cape Breton Island, changing the culture of 
work is vital to its economic survival. 
Another theory that helps explain the Cape Breton situation is a neo-Marxist 
theory of development that can be referred to as the metropolis-hinterland model. This 
theory argues that capitalists exploit the resources of the hinterland, amassing capital that 
accrues to the metropolis. In this case, Cape Breton represents the hinterland, while 
London, Toronto, Montreal, and Halifax are metropoles. If development and 
underdevelopment are two sides of the same coin in the process of accumulating capital, 
then two, non-mutually exclusive explanations of the situation are clear. First, 
underdevelopment occurs in the hinterland due to a number of factors: the hyper-
exploitation of labour, a massive capital drain that prevents the creation of value added 
production (secondary and tertiary industry), limitations to the internal market, the 
16 Higgins and Savoie, Theories & Their Application, 22. 
17 Ibid., 19. 
18 Ibid., 20. 
19 Ibid., 27. 
6 
creation of chronic unemployment, and the marginality of the surplus population. 
Secondly, capitalism on the periphery accelerates the production of relative surplus value 
(value added production), and expands the forces of production and their corresponding 
relations. If capitalism generates unemployment and poverty under conditions of 
economic contraction, it absorbs labour power under conditions of economic expansion, 
the result being unemployment and absorption, poverty and wealth, coexisting. 20 These 
two explanations of the metropolis-hinterland model for the Cape Breton situation are 
persistent throughout this examination. 
This study will take into account events starting in the 1950s to the present day. 
The 1950s represent the start of modem day regional economic development in Nova 
Scotia as well as a ten-province Canada. Four variables are used in this study: regional 
economic development, communities (voluntary sector), the private sector, and 
government. Regional economic development will be defined as a dependent variable as 
it is dependent upon government, the private sector, and the community involved. The 
private sector is an intervening variable, as is the community, as government can assist 
the private sector or a community-based group to promote economic development. At 
the same time, community groups can entice private industry to establish within a region, 
without the aid of government. Government is an independent variable as it can act 
directly to create economic development, or partner and act through an intervener. For 
this investigation, economic development represents the creation of long-term, gainful 
employment. The closure of a government-assisted enterprise, resulting in jobs lost, is an 
indication of failure to provide solid economic development. Seasonal lay-offs will not 
20 Veltmeyer, Capitalist Underdevelopment, 18. 
7 
be considered as a failure of an enterprise, given the seasonal nature of the Cape Breton 
economy, but do represent a weakness in the long-term stability of the Cape Breton 
economy. The unemployment rate (see Appendix B) will be used to demonstrate the 
improvement, over time, of the economic conditions with decreases in the unemployment 
rate as new initiatives take hold. 
Literature by academics and government documents regarding Crown 
Corporations, regional economic development, and the Cape Breton case were reviewed 
for this study. Statistics from Statistic Canada were factored in where warranted. In 
situations where information was scarce or ambiguous, newspapers, as well as interviews 
with people involved with the Crown Corporations were used. 
8 
Chapter 2 Industrial Estates Limited 
2.1 Introduction 
The first Crown Corporation to be examined is Industrial Estates Limited (IEL). 
This chapter will assess IEL's effect on the Cape Breton economy. This will be done by 
examining IEL' s method of operation, its investments in Cape Breton firms, and a 
comparison of the level of financial assistance and the success of firms in Cape Breton in 
relation to mainland Nova Scotia. This chapter will demonstrate that IEL had little to no 
impact on the Cape Breton economy in comparison to the rest of Nova Scotia. 
The desire to encourage economic development across Nova Scotia was identified 
as early as 1956 in the Conservative Party's election platform.' The following year, the 
Conservative government of Robert Stanfield introduced a bill to found IEL to fulfill the 
economic development goal. 
The motivation to establish this Crown Corporation came after the visit of Major 
General Kenelm C. Appleyard, chairman of a trading estate in England, and acquaintance 
of agriculture minister E.D. Haliburton and Nova Scotia industrialist R.A. Jodrey.2 The 
result of Appleyard's advice to the government convinced Robert Stanfield that Industrial 
Estates Limited was the best proposal to bring industry to Nova Scotia.3 IEL's mission 
1 Roy E. George, The Life and Times of Industrial Estates Limited (Institute of Public Affairs, 
Dalhousie University, 1974), 3. 
2 James P. Bickerton, Nova Scotia, Ottawa, and the Politics of Regional Development, The State 
and Economic Life. (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), 147. 
3 George, Life and Times, 6. 
9 
was to promote, diversify and develop industrial activity in Nova Scotia.4 Essentially, 
IEL had a free hand to conduct economic development activity throughout the province. 
2.2 The Plan of Operation 
A group ofNova Scotia businessmen would be the Board of Directors and run 
IEL on a part time basis as unpaid volunteers. 5 Led by supermarket magnate Frank 
Sobey,6 their strategy was to use IEL to attract industry to Nova Scotia by borrowing 
money from the province to buy lands. IEL would then construct factorie~ and buildings 
to add value and increase the investment potential of the properties. These properties 
were then leased or rented to industrial tenants who were willing to locate in the 
province.7 The location of multiple industries into group sites (industrial parks) was 
preferred to single industry, isolated sites even though the legislation pennitted isolated 
sites. Problems with municipalities in providing services to group sites caused an early 
policy shift to favour the isolated, single industries. 8 
In the search for tenants, only three restrictions were legislated on IEL, but these 
could easily be overridden with the approval of the Minister. 9 The first restriction was 
that IEL could not knowingly help an industry establish in Nova Scotia that would be in 
4 Ibid., 7. 
5 Bickerton, Nova Scotia, 146. 
6 Harry Bruce, Frank Sobey: The Man and the Empire, (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1985) 
7 George, Life and Times, 34. 
8 Ibid., 35. 
9 Robert W. Manuge, former general manager oflndustrial Estates Limited, interview by author, 
16 January 2002, by telephone. 
10 
direct competition with a business already operating in Nova Scotia. 10 The second 
restriction required IEL to consult with government departments that had previously 
given financial assistance to companies that were in talks with IEL. The final restriction 
required IEL to obtain written permission from the Minister of Trade and Industry before 
an extra group site or estate was started. 11 
Another part of the stipulations of operation was that IEL would concentrate on 
light and secondary industries; the provincial government would involve itself with 
resource development and heavy industry. 12 Although this limited the scale of economic 
development IEL could conduct, the pitch to foreign and American firms boasted a 
cheap, available, and stable workforce in Nova Scotia.13 The Board of Directors also had 
preferences in the types of businesses they wished to attract. Subsidiaries were 
unwanted, as hard times would mean their head office dictating the closure of operations 
in Nova Scotia. The ideal candidates should be those with a shortage of working capital 
as a result of aggressive growth at a young age.14 
Whereas governments can obtain loans at a lower rate of interest than an 
industrial enterprise, IEL was well positioned to pass on the interest savings to its clients. 
Although IEL was mandated to break even on the returns of its rentals, there was no 
provision for defaults and vacancies by its clients. This often meant the mandate to 
10 George, Life and Times, 9. 
II Ibid., 10. 
12 Bickerton, Nova Scotia, 147. 
13 Ibid., 148. 
14 Ibid., 148. 
11 
attract industry outweighed fiscal fitness; 15 after all, the government could always 
provide more money. 
Changes in federal taxes and programs would force IEL to change its incentives 
in 1964. Federal incentives under the Area Development Agreement (ADA) and the 
Regional Development Incentives Act (RDIA) required companies to own their own 
building.16 This made IEL's leaseback arrangements less attractive. At the same time, 
these federal programs were favoring companies in rural Nova Scotia as opposed to 
Metropolitan Halifax. 17 IEL changed its incentives to allow companies to receive their 
land and buildings through 1 00% mortgage financing as opposed to the previous lease-
purchase agreement or a loan. Financing of 60% could also be provided to purchase 
machinery. Loans could be made for up to 30 years with no penalty for early repayment. 
Negotiations with municipalities would also take place to obtain tax breaks for new IEL 
sponsored industries. 
Sometimes assistance was more generous. Loans for 80% of the cost of 
machinery were made. 18 Other times there were loans to provide working capital, but 
this action was highly discouraged. In cases where working capital loans were provided, 
the policy was to charge the firm the same interest rate that was being charged the 
government, plus one percent to cover the administration costs at IEL. 19 For areas of 
15 George, Life and Times, 36. 
16 Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, The Atlantic Economy, Seventh Annual Review (October 
1973), 44. This will be referred to as APEC in the rest of this chapter. 
17 George, Life and Times, 36. 
18 APEC, The Atlantic Economy, 44. 
19 George, Life and Times, 37. 
12 
chronically high unemployment, IEL was permitted to use special incentives to lure 
industry.20 The move to loans represents a significant departure away from the intent of 
IEL's mandate. No longer was it solely in the real estate business; it had also become a 
lending agency. If IEL was lending money to entice economic development, did Cape 
Breton Island receive its fair share ofiEL investment? Was the distribution ofiEL-
supported companies spread out evenly across the province? 
2.3 Distribution 
Not all areas of Nova Scotia had the same employment levels. Consequently, it 
might be expected out of moral obligation that areas of higher unemployment and 
economic uncertainty would receive more investment from IEL. From 1957 to 1971, IEL 
attracted no less than 77 firms to the province; the majority of these after it started 
providing loans. For Cape Breton Island, five companies which received IEL funding set 
up in Cape Breton County. The other three counties of Cape Breton Island: Victoria, 
Inverness, and Richmond, did not have any of the 77 IEL funded companies establish 
within their boundaries. 21 
As all counties have a different population base, and not every county received 
the same number of IEL funded industries, comparing the counties on a per capita basis 
seems logical in determining the spread of funding. Done by Roy E. George using the 
1957 to 1971 figures and 1971-dollar values, these calculations reveal some surprising 
facts. Despite only having five IEL funded firms, Cape Breton County received the 
largest share of funding from IEL at $46.3 million over 14 years. This was due largely to 
20 APEC, The Atlantic Economy, 44. 
21 George, Life and Times, 68. 
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an unpleasant investment in one client, Deuterium of Canada Limited.22 The per capita 
level of investment for Cape Breton County, however, was only $358?3 
In comparison, Pictou County, the home of Frank Sobey, received ten IEL funded 
industries, devouring $34.4 million ofiEL's money. This included two large 
investments: Clairtone and Michelin. The per capita investment in Pictou County works 
out to $773?4 This represents over twice as much as was receiv~ by Cape Breton 
County. When the populations of the other three counties of Cape Breton Island are 
factored in, it is clear that Cape Breton Island did not receive a proportionate amount 
:from the IEL economic development funds when compared to Pictou County. 
Other counties received funding above and beyond the four counties of Cape 
Breton. Lunenburg and Queen's Counties together received eight IEL clients, an 
investment of$36.4 million ofiEL's money. The local per capita rate of investment was 
$744, almost as much as Pictou County. The huge investment required to lure Michelin 
can explain the per capita figure for these counties. 25 Colchester County was the only 
other county to outperform Cape Breton. The home of Conservative strongmen Robert 
Stanfield and George "Ike" Smith, Colchester County had eight IEL clients with a total 
funding of$16.7 million, representing a per capita investment of$467.26 In contrast, 
Metropolitan Halifax, being the largest populated area in the province, received the most 
22 More on this will be discussed later. 
23 George, Life and Times, 68. 
24 Ibid., 68. 
25 Ibid., 68. 
26 Ibid., 68. 
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companies, 22. Total investment, however, was quite low at only $13.8 million or $56 
per capita (see Appendix B)?7 
2.4 Good, Bad, and Really Bad Investments 
As previously stated, of all the industries attracted and assisted by IEL during the 
Stanfield years, five ended up in Cape Breton County.28 Although other companies in 
Cape Breton were assisted by IEL after the departure of Robert Stanfield, information on 
these firms is marginal and incomplete. 
Angel Manufacturing and Supply Company was a small foundry operation in 
North Sydney that received $66,000 in help from IEL in 1960.29 This was to assist the 
firm after a fire destroyed the property. 30 Employment numbers fluctuated throughout 
the five decades of operation at Angel. When the company folded in 1999, there were 14 
employees.31 
Three firms were established in Cape Breton County during 1967. General 
Instruments of Canada opened in Sydney to make radio and electronics parts, providing 
941 jobs. 32 IEL was able to grant $2,900,000 worth of assistance to this firm. 33 General 
27 Ibid., 68. 
28 See Appendix C 
29 George, Life and Times, 93. 
30 Roger Angel, Director of Angel Manufacturing and Supply Company, interview by author, 22 
January 2002, by telephone. 
31 Ibid. 
32 Geoffrey Stevens, Stanfield (Toronto: McClelland and Stewart Limited, 1973), 130. 
33 George, Life and Times, 93. 
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Instruments closed shop in 1974 and moved to Mexico after unsuccessfully trying to get 
funding from the government of Gerald Regan to import parts from Chicago.34 
An abrasives company named Pyrominerals opened in Point Edward and received 
$2,300,000 in assistance. 35 Employing no more than 45 people,36 Pyrominerals was a 
major contributor to air pollution in the Sydney area. Had emission legislation been 
introduced earlier, Pyrominerals would not have gone into production.37 Subsequently, 
Pyrominerals was closed in 1971 . 
The Japanese automobile company Toyota decided to set up an assembly plant in 
Point Edward as well. Canadian Motor Industries, as it was known at the time, received 
$1,400,000 in assistance from IEL.38 Canadian Motor Industries created a degree of 
controversy as some viewed the firm in violation of the first restriction placed on IEL 
regarding competition. A prior commitment in 1963 brought the Swedish carmaker 
Volvo to establish an assembly plant in Dartmouth (later moving to Halifax).39 IEL had 
committed a $1 ,000,000 towards Volvo. IEL interpreted the competition restriction on 
the grounds of two different groups of automobile purchasers,40 hence no competition. In 
defence ofiEL's actions, Frank Sobey stated to the Industry Committee of the 
34 Robert W. Manuge, former General Manager of Industrial Estates Limited, interview by author, 
16 January 2002, by telephone. 
35 George, Life and Times, 93. 
36 Gary Fancey, a former manager with the Cape Breton Development Corporation, interview by 
author, 16 January 2002, by telephone. 
37 George, Life and Times, 108. 
38 Ibid., 93. 
39 1bid., 95. 
40 APEC, The Atlantic Economy, 48. 
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Legislature that the main market for both types of automobiles was outside the 
province.41 Besides, Volvo and Canadian Motor Industries were large exporting firms 
bringing employment and income to the province and the government could waive the 
competition restriction.42 Canadian Motor Industries employed 170 people and wanted to 
import equipment from Japan to expand operations. However, the Liberal government of 
Premier Gerald Regan refused the company's request to subsidize the new equipment. 
Hence, Canadian Motor Industries left Nova Scotia in 1975 for Ontario.43 
The largest and most costly enterprise attracted by IEL was Deuterium of Canada 
Limited (DCL). Atomic Energy of Canada Limited (AECL), a federal Crown 
Corporation, needed to purchase 200 tons of heavy water per year. In the search for a 
Canadian company, a partnership was struck between IEL and an American company, 
Deuterium Corporation, to form DCL. IEL would finance $12 million, Deuterium 
Corporation Limited would finance $18 million,44 and IEL would control the company 
with 25,001 of the 50,000 shares to ensure that the company was Canadian. 45 After 
intense political lobbying by Stanfield and winning federal cabinet support from Jack 
Pickersgill, Allan J. MacEachen, and even Prime Minister Lester Pearson, DCL was 
awarded the contract and Glace Bay was the site chosen for the plant.46 This was to be a 
41 George, Life and Times, 41. 
42 Ibid., 10. 
43 Robert W. Manuge, former General Manager of Industrial Estates Limited, interview by author, 
16 January 2002, by telephone. 
44 George, Life and Times, 77. 
45 Ibid., 83 . 
46 Bickerton, Nova Scotia, 235. 
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blessing to the local economy. There would be 200 perrnanentjobs,47 but the rumoured 
2,000 construction jobs for the two-year construction period from 1964 to 1966 amounted 
to only 400 jobs.48 
Construction moved ahead slowly. This was partly due to a shortage of 
sufficiently skilled labour from Cape Breton contractors. Work on a project of this scale 
was new ground for small time welders, electricians, and mechanics. The need for 
skilled labour caused local unions to get upset when outsiders were brought in to help.49 
In all, there were twenty-four strikes in the first two years. Delays added to the 
increasing cost and in 1966, the Government ofNova Scotia assumed control of the 
project from DCL and IEL after DCL had stopped raising money. 50 That same year, 
AECL offered to double the order of heavy water if the plant would double production 
capacity. The cabinet agonized over the decision and pressure mounted from Gerald 
Regan and the Liberal opposition to proceed. In the end, the cabinet gambled and agreed 
to proceed. 51 Another $135 million to finish the project followed. 52 On the official 
opening date of May 1967, heavy water had yet to be produced. It turned out that design 
changes to use salt water in the process were corroding the stainless steel pipes and other 
equipment. In October of 1971, Ottawa, through AECL, undertook the reconstruction of 
47 Ibid., 235. 
48 Paul MacEwan, Miners and Steelworkers, Labour in Cape Breton (Toronto: Samuel Stevens 
Hakkert and Company, 1976), 331. 
49 George, Life and Times, 82. 
50 Ibid., 78. 
51 Ibid., 79. 
52 Bickerton, Nova Scotia, 236. 
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the plant for the price tag of $95 million. 53 Ten years behind schedule, the heavy water 
plant went into production in 1976 at a cost to taxpayers over a quarter of a billion 
dollars. Clearly, IEL was in over its head. If there was a silver lining, General Electric 
decided to construct its own heavy water plant in Cape Breton at Port Hawkesbury in the 
late 1960s. 54 The Port Hawkesbury plant was not an IEL venture, but was eventually 
taken over by AECL as well. 55 With the subsequent decline in demand for nuclear 
reactors, AECL closed both plants in 1985, slashing 700 jobs in an area of 25% 
unemployment. 56 
Although most IEL ventures in Cape Breton failed, the rest ofNova Scotia would 
not be spared the embarrassment of IEL failures, including Pictou County. The attraction 
of Clairtone Sound Corporation to Nova Scotia was labeled a major coup by IEL. The 
electronics and hi-fi stereo corporation was attracted to set up on one ofiEL's properties 
in Stellarton with an $8 million loan, with interest forgiven for the first three years. The 
plant began full operations in 1966.57 The initial results were good, but the decision to 
produce colour television sets would prove disastrous. Losses began to accumulate from 
1967 to 1970. Clairtone went back to IEL in 1967 looking for $2 million. The money 
was given, on the condition that IEL would be given the controlling stake in the 
53 George, Life and Times, 78. 
54 Ibid., 81. 
55 Benjamin Higgins, Entrepreneurship and Economic Development: The Case of Cape Breton, in 
Les provinces maritimes: un regard vers l'avenir I The Maritime Provinces: Looking to the Future, eds. 
Donald J. Savoie, and Ralph Winter (Moncton: lnstitut canadien de recherche sur le developpement 
regional I The Canadian Institute for Research on Regional Development, 1993), 142. 
56 James Bickerton, "Old Wine into New Bottles? Federal Development Agencies in Cape Breton, 
1984 - 1989" (Annual Meeting of the Atlantic Provinces Political Studies Association, 1990), 7. 
57 George, Life and Times, 86. 
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company. By 1972, Clairtone was closed and the Nova Scotia government purchased the 
company from IEL for $26 million. 58 
The turbulent years of the late 1960s clouded the success of the largest firm 
attracted by IEL, Michelin. The French tire maker was attracted to Nova Scotia in 1970 
by a passive, non-unionized work force and low wages. 59 The public invested about 
$82.8 million in Michelin,60 of which IEL provided two loans for $50 million and $14.3 
million respectively, and a grant of$7.6 million. Two plants were established, one in 
Granton, Pictou County, and one in Bridgewater, Lunenburg County. Employment was 
predicted to be 2,500 jobs. 61 Michelin, being paternalistic and anti-union, would not 
establish a plant in communities where there was known union activity. Having a strong 
union history, Cape Breton did not benefit from Michelin.62 In 1979, the Buchanan 
Conservatives introduced the infamous Michelin Bill requiring all Michelin plants in the 
province to request union certification at the same time, or not at al1.63 Many viewed this 
legislation as an attack on organized labour and government pandering to big business. 
The subsequent result of the legislation was the construction of a third Michelin plant in 
58 Doug Letto, Chocolate Bars and Rubber Boots, The Smallwood Industrialization Plan 
(Paradise: Blue Hill Publishing, 1998), 86. 
59 Bickerton, Nova Scotia, 236. 
60 George, Life and Times, 111 . 
61 Ibid., 91. 
62 MacEwan, Paul, Miners and Steelworkers, Labour in Cape Breton (Toronto: Samuel Stevens 
Hakkert and Company, 1976) 
63 Bickerton, Nova Scotia, 283. 
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Waterville, King's County, the expansion of the Granton and Bridgewater plants, and 
1 ,850 additional jobs for the province. 64 
2.5 End Game 
By 1970, after some spectacular failures and successes, the election of Gerald 
Regan and the Liberals caused IEL to go into decline. Having spoken out against IEL on 
numerous occasions while in opposition in the legislature, Regan pledged to end the 
subsidization of industry by the province during his tenure. Though not disbanded, IEL' s 
role in economic development for the province was significantly reduced.65 There was 
restructuring at IEL in the Board of Directors, and in the way money was handed out. 
Money was broken down into two new categories: a Small Business Loans 
Program and General Development. From 1971 to 1976,75 businesses with almost 
1,000 employees took advantage of$3,197,000 through IEL's Small Business Loans 
Program.66 The General Development Program on the other hand, spent $89.5 million on 
45 projects, creating or maintaining 5,828 jobs over the same time period.67 Although 
this period of investment marks a significant increase in the number of assisted firms in 
comparison to the Stanfield!Sobey era, 68 the change in the political climate marked the 
decline of IEL. 
64 Twenty-third Annual Report, Industrial Estates Limited, 31 March 1980. 
65 Bickerton, Nova Scotia, 23 7. 
66 Atlantic Provinces Economic Council, Industrial Incentives Programs in the Atlantic Region 
(October, 1976), 66. 
67 Ibid., 67. 
68 Robert Stanfield left provincial politics in 1967 to become leader of the federal Progressive 
Conservative Party. While Ike Smith was Premier, Frank Sobey resigned as President of IEL in 1969. 
M.G. Taylor, Finlay MacDonald, Dean W. Salsman, and W. Leslie Single went on to become Presidents of 
IEL during the decline. 
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The year 1978 saw the province conunence the transfer of control of its industrial 
parks in Amherst, the Annapolis Valley, Springhill, and Debert to IEL. Infrastructure 
improvements to these parks such as roads and sewer were then carried out by IEL as 
well as the construction of incubator industrial malls and warehouses.69 By 1987, IEL 
was responsible for 14 industrial parks in the province. Curiously, no industrial parks in 
Cape Breton were assigned to IEL until 1987 when IEL picked up the Mulgrave Marine 
Industrial Park on the Strait of Canso and became the rental agent of AECL for the heavy 
water plant properties in Port Hawkesbury and Glace Bay.70 
The recognition of the importance of small business development by the province 
in 1981 resulted in the creation of a Small Business Development Corporation under the 
umbrella of the provincial Department of Development. IEL's Small Business Financing 
Program and staff were transferred to this new body. 71 The following year, the 
Department of Development also assumed the role of promoting IEL. 72 IEL was again 
restricted to the general development business and responsibility for the province' s 
industrial parks. IEL was completely absorbed into the Department of Development in 
1987. 
2.6 Conclusion 
It seems that when IEL departed from the business of industrial real estate to that 
of providing loans and grants, the company began experiencing problems. There is 
69 Twenty-First Annual Report, Industrial Estates Limited, March 31 , 1978, 3. 
70 Thirtieth Annual Report, Industrial Estates Limited, March 31 , 1987, 4. 
71 Twenty-Fourth Annual Report, Industrial Estates Limited, March 31, 1981, 3. 
72 Twenty-Fifth Annual Report, Industrial Estates Limited, March 31 , 1982, 2. 
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always the risk oflosing on an investment when it comes to economic development, but 
it seems that this risk was increased when IEL decided to become part owner in 
companies. When the reach exceeded the grasp, the IEL investment capitulated. 73 
In theory, IEL was a good industrial development strategy; a Crown Corporation 
able to borrow low interest money from government lenders to develop properties and 
lease the property to industry at a cost lower than what industry would have originally 
spent. The switch to low rate mortgage financing was resourceful, but led IEL to new 
forms oflending, a significant departure from the original development strategy. 
In practice, over 13,000 jobs were created or maintained throughout IEL's thirty 
years of operation in the Province of Nova Scotia.74 Unfortunately, Cape Breton Island 
did not share proportionally in the employment and investment created by IEL. IEL only 
created 220 or so long term jobs in Cape Breton, and 1,161 short-term jobs in the 1967 
unemployment crisis. When these two figures are combined, they represent only 10% of 
all the jobs IEL created. Mainland Nova Scotia received the lion' s share of the benefits 
created by IEL activities. 
Financially, IEL spent over $300 million investing and attracting firms to Nova 
Scotia. When money from the Province of Nova Scotia to cover Deuterium and 
Clairtone is factored in, the figure exceeds half a billion dollars. Although the intention 
was to recover much of the money loaned, IEL continually ran large deficits that were 
covered by the province. By 1983 the Province no longer covered the full deficit for IEL. 
In retrospect, had the Board of Directors been employed on a permanent basis, and had 
73 Bickerton, Nova Scotia, 236. 
74 See Appendix D 
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sufficient qualified staff been hired to assist in the determination of good and bad 
investments, mistakes like Clairtone and Deuterium might have been avoided. 
In terms of a responsibility to create employment, Angel Manufacturing and 
Deuterium may have provided long-term employment, but the heavy water gamble did 
not live up to the promises that were presented. In large part, this can be attributed to the 
decline of the nuclear power industry after the Three Mile Island nuclear incident in the 
United States in 1979. 
The actions of Canadian Motor Industries and General Instruments clearly 
conform to the capitalist behavior described by neo-Marxist underdevelopment theories. 
These two ventures exploited the available cheap labour from thousands of unemployed 
citizens, drained the area of financial capital from both primary production and 
government subsidies, and when the government funding was exhausted they vacated the 
hinterland to Ontario and Mexico respectively. 
The IEL experience shows that government, through Crown Corporations, can 
independently foster economic development. In terms of policy instruments used by IEL 
(which is itself an instrument of the government), infrastructure provision is the 
independent action of the government, through its Crown Corporation, to directly create 
long-term gainful employment or indirectly, by using infrastructure to lure private sector 
investment. Crown Corporations can also act through the intervening variable, the 
private sector, by using other policy instruments in the form ofloans, mortgages, grants, 
and subsidies, as well as by actively campaigning the private sector and marketing 
locations and growth poles. The IEL experience also shows that just because a business 
locates at a growth pole (Sydney/Glace Bay or the Strait of Canso), this does not mean 
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the business will succeed. The fate ofDCL's quarter billion dollar heavy water plant in 
Glace Bay and General Electric's similar plant in Port Hawkesbury are evidence of this. 
In terms of policy objectives, IEL was a tool to foster economic transition, 
province building through industrialization, and subtle intervention in the economy for its 
betterment. IEL also provides a warning to economic developers to beware of large, 
financially unsound operations that require subsidies. These firms conform to the neo-
Marxist model of capitalist underdevelopment. Based on these assessments, it is clear 
that IEL's role in the economic development of Cape Breton Island was less effective 
than it was in the rest of Nova Scotia. 
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Chapter 3 Cape Breton Development Corporation 
3.1 Introduction 
For almost three centuries, coal mining and steel making have been the industrial 
staples of the Cape Breton economy. The last of the private companies to be engaged in 
this activity in Cape Breton was Dominion Steel and Coal Company Limited (Dosco ). 
The largest employer east ofMontreal, with 10,500 employees in Cape Breton in 1965,1 
employment stability with Dosco had been questioned since the period following the First 
World War due to rising coal subsidies. This chapter recounts the demise ofDosco and 
the federal government's attempt to foster economic development through the Cape 
Breton Development Corporation (Devco ). This chapter will clearly show two phases of 
economic development policies, and three phases of coal mining policies executed by 
Devco and examine the cause and effects of these changes in policy. Finally, Devco will 
be shown to have simultaneously helped and hindered the economic development of 
Cape Breton by having an overreaching mandate, artificially propping up the economy, 
and departing from its original mandate. 
3.2 The Decline ofDosco 
In the first six months of 1957, Dosco recorded a profit of$7,563,355.13.2 That 
same year, aircraft manufacturer A. V. Roe Canada purchased the controlling stake in 
1 J.R. Donald, The Cape Breton Coal Problem (Ottawa: Queen 's Printer, 1966), I. 
2 Harry Bruce, Frank Sobey: The Man and the Emp ire (Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1985), 
211. 
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Dosco. At the pithead, mines were being exhausted and closed, equipment was aging, 
and new investment was needed. Underground and submarine mines, such as those in the 
Sydney coalfield, were more costly to operate than open pit strip mines. Federal 
subsidies ensured the competitiveness of Cape Breton coal, something unheard of in the 
United States' s coal industry.3 The Royal Commission on Coal in 1960 (Rand Report) 
noted the rise of other sources of fuel such as oil, gas, hydroelectric, and nuclear power 
against which Cape Breton coal had to compete in an international marketplace. In 
February 1959, Prime Minister Diefenbaker announced the cancellation of A.V. Roe's 
top project, the supersonic Avro Arrow. As stock prices fell, Hawker Siddeley purchased 
A.V. Roe and the Dosco assets. In 1962 A.V. Roe became known as Hawker Siddeley 
Canada Limited.4 With Hawker Siddeley unable to re-invest in the Cape Breton coal 
industry, rehabilitation could only come from external intervention. 
In 1965 Dosco announced it would no longer mine iron ore from the submarine 
iron mines of Bell Island, Newfoundland, throwing the tiny island into economic chaos. 
This announcement meant the steel plant in Sydney had lost its primary source of ore. 
That same year, Dosco enlisted British experts to evaluate and advise on the future of 
coal mining in Cape Breton. The result was a demand for $25 million from the federal 
government to rehabilitate the collieries and open a new pit at Lingan. Ottawa shot back 
with its own study, The Cape Breton Coal Problem by J. R. Donald. Before the Donald 
3 I. C. Rand, Report of the Royal Commission on Coal (Ottawa: Queen's Printer and Controller of 
Stationary, 1960), 12. 
4 Bruce, Sobey, 216. 
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Report could be released in August 1966, Dosco announced in April it was getting out of 
the coal mining business. 5 Although good business sense dictated that closure of the 
coalmines was the right thing to do, social consciousness indicated this was an 
irresponsible action. All levels of government could not allow the shutdown of the 
largest employer in the Cape Breton economy. Something had to be done. 
The Donald Report evaluated numerous proposed plans and brought about 
recommendations for the aging industry. One recommendation was the establishment of 
a Crown Corporation with $150 million in funding over 15 years "to strengthen and 
stimulate the Cape Breton economy through the exploitation of its resources and the 
promotion and establishment of industry."6 Another recommendation was to establish a 
second Crown Corporation to acquire Dosco assets and manage the collieries. Donald 
also warned against the establishment of a new coal mine at Lingan. 7 Rather, Donald 
wanted a fifteen-year phase out of the coal industry.8 
The federal government's reaction to the crisis was to create a single Crown 
Corporation, the Cape Breton Development Corporation. Devco, as it came to be known, 
would conduct both economic development and take over the operation of the collieries 
in spite of the Donald Report's recommendations to separate the two objectives. Devco 
would in effect replace the federal subsidies to the Cape Breton coal industry and become 
5 James P. Bickerton, Nova Scotia, Ottawa, and the Politics of Regional Development, The State 
and Economic Life. (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1990), 199. 
6 Donald, Coal Problem, 35. 
7 1bid., 35. 
8 Bickerton, Nova Scotia, 199. 
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the principal employer, keeping thousands of people off welfare. It was instructed to 
promptly reduce the workforce through an early retirement plan and then phase out the 
four mines by 1981.9 Devco was projected to operate at a loss throughout its fifteen-year 
life span. Amazingly, Devco would go on to operate for 34 years. Not only that, Devco 
would go against the Donald Report's recommendations and open three new mines, and 
prepare for a fourth. 
3.3 The Start of Devco 
Devco was structured so there would be two separate divisions, one for coal 
production, and one for industrial development. Each would have separate allocations of 
funds, budgets, and vice-presidents, and neither fund allocation could be interchanged 
with the other division.10 As such, the Industrial Development Division received $20 
million from Ottawa and another $10 million from the Province of Nova Scotia to create 
an industrial base in Cape Breton to replace the coal industry. 11 The Coal Division was 
allocated $25 million to rehabilitate the mines. 
After carefully examining the situation with each mine in 1968, and the funds 
required to maximize output in light of future coal policy, management decided to invest 
the $25 million into the creation of a new mine in the Lingan area. The plan called for 
9 Tom Kent, "The Cape Breton Development Corporation: One Canadian Case of Planning on 
the Spot, " in Canadians and Regional Development at Home and in the Third World, ed. Benjamin 
Higgins and Donald Savoie (Sackville: Tribune Press, 1988), 93. 
10 Bickerton, Nova Scotia, 247. 
11 Second Annual Report, Cape Breton Development Corporation, 31 March 1969, 12. 
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the production of two million tons of coal, in conjunction with Number 26 colliery, but a 
vastly reduced work force. 12 So right from the start, even though the plan was to phase 
out coal mining, plans for a new mine were being prepared. This is in stark contrast to 
the recommendations of the Donald Report that warned against such a move.13 
Over at the Industrial Development Division (IDD), similar questions were being 
raised. Noting the crumbling social infrastructure in the Cape Breton County area, 
Devco's IDD invested in the construction of an apartment complex.14 Although this was 
not a new industry, economic development cannot occur unless the proper infrastructure 
is in place, hence the spending decision. 
These two examples demonstrate one point: with Devco established, Ottawa and 
Halifax did not have to worry about the socio-economic problem in Cape Breton; the 
problem belonged to Devco. Devco was free to undertake whatever was necessary to 
achieve its industrial development goals. Although this is not necessarily a bad thing, 
further assistance from the federal and provincial governments in terms of guidance, 
backing, and further intervention might have been welcomed. 15 
12 Ibid., 7. 
13 The rationalization of this decision is discussed later. 
14 Second Annual Report, Cape Breton Development Corporation, 31 March 1969, 13-15. 
15 Bickerton, Nova Scotia, 247-8. 
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3.4 Money down the pit 
The mood of uncertainty hanging over Cape Breton Island due to the inevitable 
closure of the mines meant Devco had to get new industry up and running as soon as 
possible. Within the first two years of operation, the Industrial Development Division 
spent close to $10 million on nine new industries and several smaller projects. Seven of 
these industries left once their funding expired. 16 Two of the more memorable projects 
Devco funded were on the other end of the island at the Strait of Canso, far from the coal 
mine problems. Devco provided funding, in conjunction with the province of Nova 
Scotia, for the Stora pulp and paper mill to expand in Port Hawkesbury. 17 The other 
project was the development of a deep-water dock for Gulf Oil to offload Middle-Eastern 
oil for refining in Point Tupper.18 
The arrival of Tom Kent as President ofDevco in 1971 fundamentally changed 
the direction of Devco' s Industrial Development Division. Schemes to bring in large 
industrial projects took a back seat to the development of traditional industries, local 
resources, and talents in Cape Breton. The five year plan, proposed in 1972, did not rule 
out attracting external investment, but Kent recognized that external industrial 
intervention alone would not be the savior for the Cape Breton economy.19 
16 Bickerton, Nova Scotia, 249. 
17 Kent, Planning on the Spot, 94. 
18 Ibid., 93. 
19 Ibid., 96. 
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One assessment was that the Cape Breton economy lacked the entrepreneurial 
spirit due in part to the early presence of big business looking after all interests. As such, 
Devco's Industrial Development Division set about various development plans for the 
tourism sector and primary industry. Devco viewed its role in the tourism sector as being 
to make the island's natural and historic attractions more available and more interesting 
to visitors.20 To accomplish part of this goal, strategic loans were provided to carefully 
selected homeowners for renovations to provide bed and breakfast accommodations for 
the tourist sector.21 By 1980, 55 homeowners had taken part in the bed and breakfast 
program. 22 Devco also got into the construction of key tourist infrastructure. This 
included four tourist booths in co-operation with the Cape Breton Tourist Association, 
restaurants, motels, and chowder houses where needed. Other firms with tourist 
infrastructure received loans for their restaurants and motels, as did a ski hill in Cape 
Smokey. 
Devco also undertook the operation of a historic tourist railway between Sydney 
and Glace Bay. Initially a very successful profit generator, Devco made the mistake of 
relaying abandoned track and expanding to two trains early in its operation. Profits 
quickly evaporated due to high overhead from a unionized work force and once the 
20 Seventh Annual Report, Cape Breton Development Corporation, 31 December 1973,41. 
21 Kent, Planning on the Spot, 97. 
22 Ibid., I 06. 
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novelty for local patrons wore off. In hindsight, the railway might have been a long 
lasting tourist attraction if it had not grown so quickly.23 
Primary and cottage industries also had their share of investment from Devco. 
Since Cape Breton has a dominant Scottish heritage, the traditional Scottish industry of 
sheep farming for wool and lamb was identified as a potential recipient of Devco 
assistance. Started in 1972, by 1975 sheep numbers on the island had tripled to 9,000 
head, 1,500 of which arrived from Scotland through airlift in 1975.24 Agriculture overall 
was to profit from investment by Devco. Fruit and vegetable growers were encouraged 
to feed the whole island, beef cattle were being raised, overgrown farm land was 
reclaimed, grains planted, as well as the construction of food processing facilities. 
Aquaculture also received recognition as a potential growth industry. Oyster 
farming was started in Baddeck on the Bras D' Or Lakes. 25 Mussel, trout, and salmon 
farming soon followed. Not surprisingly, it was not long before the fish plants 
throughout the island began receiving loan assistance for structure and wharf 
rehabilitation. 26 
As can be noted from the strategy detailed above, the industries started were 
largely seasonal with a small workforce. Despite this reliance on traditional, seasonal 
industries, new full time employers involved in boat building and modular home 
23 1bid., 106-7. 
24 Ninth Annual Report, Cape Breton Development Corporation, 31 March 1976, 26. 
25 Sixth Annual Report, Cape Breton Development Corporation, 31 December 1972, 19-26. 
26 Sixth Annual Report, Cape Breton Development Corporation, 31 December 1972, 19-26. 
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construction established in Cape Breton. One such firm was the boat builder Cabotcraft. 
The partnership between Devco and Marketing Dynamics Limited of Toronto was to 
result in the construction of motor-sailor pleasure boats at a Point Edward facility and 
employ 60 people.27 The first few years were difficult, and Devco investment topped 
$1.4 million,28 but by 1977 the company was experiencing a backlog of orders and a 
production rate of 29 vessels a year. 29 Design diversification resulted and sales remained 
strong, but signs of trouble for the fiberglass and wooden boat builder began in 1978 with 
the rising costs of the Cabot 36 model. Also, an American firm had identified the niche 
market the Cabot 36 would occupy, and soon created a comparable craft at a lower 
price. 30 By 1979, Cabotcraft was closed by Devco and the assets sold to a new company, 
which commenced production of 20 foot fishing boats. 31 
If anything, the 1970s initiatives of the Industrial Development Division were to 
strengthen the traditional economy with limited employment opportunities being largely 
seasonal. Large-scale economic development from fly-by-night operations through 
grants was discouraged. The tourism industry received the largest benefits and this 
investment has resulted in a legacy of attracting people to drive the Cabot Trail, sail the 
Bras D'Or Lakes, or take in the rich history of Fortress Louisburg. However, the plan 
27 Seventh Annual Report, Cape Breton Development Corporation, 31 December 1973, 29-30. 
28 Ninth Annual Report, Cape Breton Development Corporation, 31 March 1976, 23. 
29 Tenth Annual Report, Cape Breton Development Corporation, 31 March 1977, 16. 
3° Kent, Planning on the Spot, 112. 
31 Twelfth Annual Report, Cape Breton Development Corporation, 31 March 1979, 21. 
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was really directed towards the development of sparsely-populated rural areas and was 
not sufficient to foster the development of urban industry.32 
3.5 More mines 
The mid 1970s witnessed the true power of the world's oil producers. As the 
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) increased the price for oil, 
inflation ensued and demand for cheaper energy increased. The world had become 
dependent on oil and was rudely awakened to that fact. Coal was once again seen as a 
viable option. 
Devco was supposed to be phasing out the collieries, but had made the conscious 
decision in 1968 to develop a new mine at Lingan, despite the recommendations of the 
Donald Report. The rationalization for this decision was that Lingan would be like a 
cushion: as mines closed forcing some miners to retire, other miners would be shifted to 
Lingan until retirement. The shock to the Cape Breton economy would not be as abrupt 
as an immediate phase out of all mines. This would be more gradual, and could be used 
to buy time until new industry established. The oil crisis would change this thinking. 
By 1972, the phase out of coal was no longer an option according to Tom Kent; 
modernization became the preferred course of action. 33 With the strategic decision made 
and Lingan under development, new coal deposits had to be exploited to replace the 
aging workings of the Princess, Number 20, and Number 12 collieries. The Number 12 
32 Bickerton, Nova Scotia, 250. 
33 Kent, Planning on the Spot, 114-5. 
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colliery was closed earlier than expected in 1973 due to an underground fire. 34 Number 
20 also closed in 1972 due to safety considerations. 35 The 99 year-old Princess colliery 
became the last of the old mines to close. Citing poor geological conditions, the decision 
was made in 197 4 to phase out Princess, and relocate the miners and equipment to a new 
mine to be developed in the vicinity that would become the Prince mine in Point Aconi.36 
In February of 1975, Don Jamieson, Minister for the Department of Regional Economic 
Expansion (DREE) announced loan financing for the mine on behalf of the federal 
government. 37 Miners from the three old mines took their retirement, went to work at 
Lingan, or were redeployed in the development efforts for Prince. 
The coal strategy called for the production of two million tons from the Lingan, 
Prince, and Number 26 mines. 38 The one thing Devco needed now was a buyer for the 
coal, and Nova Scotia Power Corporation obliged. Nova Scotia Power began 
construction of a coal-fired electrical generating station, practically beside the Lingan 
colliery. Completed ahead of schedule, 10% under budget and online by 1979, the plant 
would consume 1.5 million tons of coal a year, employ 175 highly skilled workers, and 
34 Eighth Annual Report, Cape Breton Development Corporation, 31 March 1975, 10. 
35 Fifth Annual Report, Cape Breton Development Corporation, 31 December 1971,6. 
36 Eighth Annual Report, Cape Breton Development Corporation, 31 March 1975, 10. 
37 Ibid., 9. 
38 James Bickerton, "Old Wine into New Bottles? Federal Development Agencies in Cape Breton, 
1984 - 1989" (Annual Meeting of the Atlantic Provinces Political Studies Association, 1990), 4. 
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have a capacity of 600 megawatts of electricity. 39 The remaining coal from the strategy 
would be destined for international export and to Sydney Steel for coking. 
The number of miners was cut in half by the middle of the 1970s. This would 
mark another significant departure, the hiring of new miners. The rising demand for coal, 
and the development of new mines with miners retiring necessitated this move. It would 
not be until the middle of the 1980s that employment figures returned to the mid 1970s 
level, and then entered into permanent decline (see Appendix E). The peak of this new 
hiring spree at Devco coincided with a second oil crisis, which caused Devco to consider 
adding three new mines to increase production to 1 0 million tons. 40 
A confidential commercial document found among the papers of Rev. Andy 
Hogan, a Roman Catholic priest and the first NDP Member of Parliament from Nova 
Scotia, indicates a desire among Devco management to commit the corporation to 
billions of dollars in capital expenditures and a return to 1967 employment levels.41 
Citing expansion as the only means to bring about financial viability and commercial 
competitiveness, the document assessed the viability of the proposed mines at Phalen, 
Donkin, and Glace Bay. Assessed on the amount of risk, the return on investment, and 
the economic benefits, the Phalen mine seemed to be the safest investment with the least 
amount of risk, and the largest return on investment. Donkin had already been under 
development by this point despite having the largest amount of risk, the lowest return on 
39 Kent, Planning on the Spot, 101. 
40 Bickerton, Old Wine, 4. 
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investment, but the highest amount of economic benefits. Under the new strategy, Phalen 
would come on stream first in 1985, followed by Donkin in 1991.42 Donkin was 
estimated to have 1.8 billion tonnes of coal, half of which would be recoverable. In 1982, 
this was the largest known reserve in North America.43 There would be one problem 
with this plan: Number 26 colliery. 
Number 26 was slated for closure in 1992 as the new Glace Bay colliery was 
brought into production. However, a fire in April of 1984 would change the course of 
action at Devco; Number 26 was forced to close permanently, throwing 1,200 miners out 
ofwork.44 In a way, the fire at Number 26 was a blessing in disguise. Devco was facing 
increasing deficits due to its reliance on Nova Scotia Power as its primary customer, 
which paid below-market prices for the coal produced. Department of Regional 
Industrial Expansion (DRIE) minister Ed Lumley placed a moratorium on Devco's 
ambitious expansion plans until a new contract with Nova Scotia Power could be signed. 
The fire and death of one miner at Number 26 became a catalyst for Devco and Nova 
Scotia Power to negotiate. Once the deal was signed, DRIE lifted the moratorium within 
a month and approved $342 million for expansion.45 
41 Cape Breton Development Corporation, Strategic Overview 1982 -2007 "A Plan for Corporate 
Growth " September, 1982. This document was found among the papers of Rev. Andy Hogan. 
42 1bid., 5. 
43 Ibid., 8. 
44 Bickerton, Old Wine, 5. 
45 Bickerton, Nova Scotia, 293-4. 
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3.6 Identity Crisis 
The outgoing federal Liberal administration sent Devco a parting gift: a new 
Chairman of the Board named Joe Shannon. Shannon set about clearing house with 
layoffs in senior management and a desire to run Devco in a more business-like manner. 
Coal operations were to be put on a sound commercial basis. This would be 
accomplished through increased production, improved financial performance, 
management accountability, and a restoration of confidence with all the stakeholders.46 
Also, the Industrial Development Division would be scaled back. 
Changing the ways Devco conducted business meant upsetting the apple cart in 
Cape Breton. This was played out when Devco stopped buying products from local 
fabrication shops, opting for external purchases. This was followed by the layoff of 480 
miners. Such actions had Devco accused of being heartless and forgetting the social 
implications of its decisions.47 For Cape Bretoners, Devco represented all things to all 
people. No one person could give an accurate answer if asked what Devco's role was. 
The dual role of coal producer and industrial developer was causing an identity crisis. 
The new leadership decided Devco would no longer be an undefined, unfocused, 
experiment with regional economic development. This also coincided with the paradigm 
shift in regional development policy after the election of the Brian Mulroney 
40 Ibid., 294. 
47 Bickerton, Old Wine, 6. 
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Conservatives in 1984. Devco was on its way to becoming a market driven coal 
producer, dropping the social and economic welfare role.48 
The paradigm shift in Ottawa meant changes in the way regional economic 
development would be conducted. Starting in May of 1986, Enterprise Cape Breton 
(ECB) would be a new development agency in Cape Breton to administer the Cape 
Breton Investment Tax Credit and to act as a one-stop shop for DRIE programs for Cape 
Breton. Hence, there were two parallel agencies mandated to assist the Cape Breton 
economy, Devco's IDD and ECB.49 Soon there would be a third. In June of 1987, the 
Mulroney government announced a new agency to alleviate the worsening economic 
situation in Atlantic Canada. The Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency (ACOA) would 
have a budget of $1 billion over 5 years. Once the legislation was introduced, however, 
ACOA would assume responsibility for ECB and Devco's IDD.50 IDD would be stripped 
from Devco and transformed into a separate Crown Corporation known as Enterprise 
Cape Breton Corporation (ECBC) responsible for industrial development on the island. 
Joe Shannon and Senator Allan J. MacEachen objected to this move, warning the social 
and economic mandate entrusted to Devco would be at stake if the IDD was removed and 
placed under ACOA in the form ofECBC.51 Nonetheless, the new relationships were 
48 Bickerton, Nova Scotia, 294-5. 
49 Bickerton, Old Wine, 8. 
50 Ibid., 15-16. 
51 James Bickerton, "Looking Back Before Going Forward: Assessing the Regional Development 
Aspects of the Devco Closure" (Atlantic Provinces Political Studies Meeting, 2001), 8. 
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finalized in 1989; ECB and ECBC would overlap in the programs and services delivered, 
and report to ACOA, reducing Devco to a Crown owned coal producer. 52 
3. 7 Profits and Phase Out 
The 1990s would prove to be the "make or break" decade for Devco. In the sole 
role as coal producer, Devco would have to prove its profitability, or be closed. The 
same question that faced the collieries in 1967 faced it again over twenty years later. The 
difference this time was the number of people dependent on the industry for a livelihood. 
There were only 3,000 employees in 1990 compared to 6,600 in 1967. By 1991, Devco 
was breaking even and recorded a profit for five years from 1993 to 1998.53 However, 
the change to being strictly a coal company meant the end ofDevco being a socially-
conscious employer, despite having this social purpose written into its statute. 54 
The Phalen mine went into production in the 1987 - 1988 fiscal year, two years 
behind schedule. 55 The Donkin mine, once viewed as the replacement for the Prince 
mine, was mothballed indefinitely. Circumstances would change in 1993 when Devco 
closed the Lingan colliery early, citing higher operating costs. 56 The same fate would 
befall Phalen four years later when rock falls, roof collapses, and flooding forced most of 
52 Bickerton, Old Wine, 19. 
53 Cape Breton Development Corporation, Annual Reports, March 1990 to 2000, see Appendix E 
54 Tom Kent, Cape Breton provides pointers for the adjustment programs required by the decline 
of the old economy, Working Paper 14. (School of Policy Studies, February 2001), 6. 
55 Annual Report, Cape Breton Development Corporation, March 1988,2. 
56 Annual Report, Cape Breton Development Corporation, March 1993, 4. 
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the mine to close. 57 Although Devco had achieved the goal of self-sufficiency, geology 
had turned the tables on the corporation. At the same time, Ottawa's sentiment on the 
matter had turned to apathy about the three decades-old problem. 58 The federal Liberal 
government of Jean Chretien was fighting a deficit and unloading unnecessary 
government operations. Devco seemed to fit the divestiture criteria. 
With losses mounting again, the Government of Canada announced the ''winding 
up" ofDevco in 1999.59 The intention was to privatize Devco's profitable Prince mine 
and sell the other assets. Severance packages were offered to some miners while others 
were left high and dry. This move forced the United Mine Workers Union into a wildcat 
strike. Picket lines went up at the Prince mine and miners descended into the pit for a 
hunger strike. Blockades were set up to prevent the delivery of coal to Nova Scotia 
Power. With Nova Scotia Power running low on coal reserves, the possibility of no 
electricity was a reality. The strike forced the hand of the federal government into 
providing a better severance package for the miners, even though some would still be left 
out. As was the case with coal mining in Cape Breton, an appropriate private buyer for 
the Prince mine could not be found. The last shift at Prince was worked in late 
57 Annual Report, Cape Breton Development Corporation, March 1998,4. 
58 Kent, Cape Breton, 7. 
59 Bickerton, Looking Back, 8. 
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November of2001.60 The regional development and social welfare experiment was 
finally over. 
3.8 Conclusion 
Where labour is paid a sustenance wage and where people can be hired and fired 
at will is an indication of hyper-exploitation oflabour. Dosco was ready to lay off 10,500 
people at once. In 1967, the Montreal-based Dosco represented a metropolis capitalist 
enterprise engaged in the hyper-exploitation oflabour and the exportation of capital from 
the hinterland. Added to the grievance was an already serious unemployment problem, 
and an inability to provide a value added product with coal. In order to prevent a grave 
economic situation from getting worse, Devco was created to alleviate certain social 
disaster. The Crown Corporation would go on to cost the federal government $1.5 billion 
over the next 34 years. 61 Almost immediately from start up, Devco went wrong on the 
economic development front. In the first phase of economic development policies, 
Devco committed the same economic development sin as Industrial Estates Limited did 
in Cape Breton: the provision of corporate welfare to unsound businesses with large 
payrolls. Of course with government-assisted businesses failing in Cape Breton, the 
private sector was reluctant to set up shop. 
60 Cape Breton Coal. Fighting for Life Available from 
http://www.cbc.ca/news/indepth/capebreton/index.html Internet: accessed 31 March 2002. 
611bid. 
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The second phase of economic development policies provided Devco a reprieve 
during and after the presidency ofT om Kent. Concentrating on home-grown traditional 
industries and entrepreneurship, some success was obtained in sectors like tourism and 
aquaculture, which has since flourished. These economic development benefits should 
not be downplayed. In particular, Devco' s involvement with the University College of 
Cape Breton on various programs has been able to instil an entrepreneurial spirit and a 
sense that people will have to help themselves and make their own work, or otherwise 
leave the island. 
On the coal side of the operation, the departure from intentions to phase out coal 
production into the policy of opening new mines in response to the petroleum crisis was a 
questionable decision, if taken only to reduce unemployment. The Donald Report clearly 
stated the case for Cape Breton coal in 1966. Having ignored many of the Donald Report 
recommendations, Devco became a means of delaying the inevitable for thirty years. As 
far as employment was concerned, what few jobs Devco created were far outweighed by 
the continual downsizing and expense incurred in modernizing the collieries. Devco 
regained its focus after the IDD was turned into ECBC. This permitted Devco to 
concentrate on profitable coal operations or the shut down of the industry (the final phase 
of coal policy). Geological conditions forced Devco to close the collieries in 1999. 
Naturally occurring events will wreak havoc on the best of plans and cannot always be 
controlled for. 
Devco, as an instrument of the federal government, was used to coordinate 
multiple policy objectives. Devco was set up to provide for economic transition from the 
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reliance on one industry to many. Devco also provided income stability, allowing life in 
the households of miners to proceed as close to normal as possible. Devco was also a 
commitment to the community, a commitment that the government had not given up on 
them and that new employment was on the horizon. Having commitment built 
confidence in the community and encouraged people to stay, seeking employment or 
becoming entrepreneurs in their own right. Once the oil crisis hit in the mid 1970s a new 
objective was added to Devco's responsibilities: the security of an energy supply. This in 
turn, led to province and nation building in one form or another, such as the coal fired 
power plants on the island. 
The Devco experience reminds economic developers to concentrate on 
development on the home front, not to rely on external intervention alone. This means 
reducing the dependence on staple industries by reinvigorating these industries and 
introducing new ones to take up the slack from the decline of older ones. It also means 
human resource development, education and training in entrepreneurship. Once this is 
done, further encouragement through policy tools such as grants, loans, tax concessions 
and other supports are necessary for entrepreneurs to take root and succeed. 
Having mined coal for over 300 years means a culture developed around the coal 
industry. Changing a culture does not happen overnight; patience for a generational shift 
needs to be factored in. Unfortunately, Devco departed from its intentions to phase out 
the industry and created a new generation of coal miners. In doing so, the coal-based 
economy was kept alive, delaying the inevitable, and misdirecting development dollars. 
Juggling economic development with continuing coal operations created a state of 
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ambiguity and confusion that could have been avoided. Devco succeeded in providing a 
measure of economic development, but failed for not doing more to fulfill its primary 
mandate: the diversification and revitalization of Cape Breton's economy. 
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Chapter 4 Sydney Steel Corporation 
4.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter is to argue that the Sydney Steel Corporation (Sysco) 
severely hindered the economic development of Cape Breton. With the provincial 
government and the people of Cape Breton stuck in a mindset that the steel plant must 
continue to be the economic anchor of the island's economy, billions of dollars were 
spent with one agenda in mind: keep steel-making alive and maximize employment, no 
matter what the cost. This chapter takes a historical perspective and recounts the 
modernization process and the search for a private sector buyer. It will also be 
demonstrated that Sysco's fate can be explained by various theories of regional economic 
development, including approaches based on geography, culture, and nee-Marxist 
analysis. 
While the Cape Breton economy was reeling from the announcement of the 
closure of the Dominion Steel and Coal Company (Dosco) collieries in 1967, Premier 
Robert Stanfield had an impending election. With Ottawa securing the fate of Cape 
Breton coal with the Cape Breton Development Corporation (Devco ), Stanfield sought 
assurances from Dosco that the Sydney Works steel plant would continue operating. 
With assurances in hand, Stanfield called an election for the 30th of May 1967. The 
people ofNova Scotia returned him to power with 40 of 46 seats. The six Liberals 
elected were scattered throughout the province. By September, Stanfield had been 
chosen federal Progressive Conservative Party leader. It did not take Dosco long to drop 
the ball. On October 13th, a day that became known as "Black Friday," Dosco announced 
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plans to close Sydney Works by the end of April1968. 1 Like the coalmines, the federal 
and provincial governments were called upon to save 3,000 jobs.2 Dosco clearly behaved 
as profit-maximizing capitalists in the neo-Marxist metropolis-hinterland model of 
economic development. In this case the parent company made its profits by exploiting 
Cape Breton's readily-available labour and running down the infrastructure of the steel 
plant. 
The Federal Cabinet was made aware of the closure the day before the 
announcement was made. 3 Ottawa made its intentions clear that it would not bail out the 
steel plant, leaving the community to turn to the provincial government for help.4 
Stanfield's successor, Premier Ike Smith, announced on 23 of November 1967 the 
Province of Nova Scotia would assume the operations of the steel plant at least until 
April of 1969. Premier Smith expressed his reservations about the province going into 
the steel business. 5 Smith also knew that acquiring the steel plant would limit the 
province in its attempts to do other things that should be done. 6 However, the presence of 
such a large industry was expected to act as a growth pole in its geographical area to 
attract secondary and tertiary industries to use the steel produced. This was the sentiment 
1 James P. Bickerton, Nova Scotia, Ottawa, and the Politics of Regional Development, The State 
and Economic Life. (Toronto: University ofToronto Press, 1990), 200. 
2 Joan Remple Bishop, "The Sydney Steel Plant, Government Policy and Public Ownership" 
(M.A. diss. , McGill University, 1984), 79. 
3 National Archives of Canada, Cabinet Meeting Minutes, RG 2, Vol6323. 
4 Bickerton, 201 . 
5 Ibid., 251. 
6 Bishop, 84. 
48 
expressed by members of the Nova Scotia Legislative Assembly in the December 1967 
debate on the creation of the Sydney Steel Corporation. 7 
4.2 The Options 
Asswning the operation of the steel plant was a huge responsibility for the 
financially strapped Province of Nova Scotia. Ottawa would not integrate the steel plant 
into Devco's operation. Allan MacEachen, Minister ofNational Health and Welfare, and 
a Member of Parliament from Cape Breton Island, stated in the House of Commons that 
the Sydney steel plant was part of the growing steel industry in Canada and it would be 
unfair to single out one plant for public funding. 8 This was despite the fact that West 
Germany had decided to subsidize one of its plants.9 MacEachen also argued that the 
constitutional and jurisdiction case favoured the province. 10 On a national level, there 
were no policy objectives that a nationalized Sydney Works could further. The national 
steel industry was strong, and a supply of steel did not have to be obtained for the 
country. However, the nationalization of the steel plant would represent a commitment to 
the community and the maintenance of employment. Since the provincial government is 
closer to the community, responsibility was pressed on them. Devco also represented a 
7 Nova Scotia. Debates and Proceedings of the House of Assembly. December 1967. 
8 Bishop, 81. 
9 Nova Scotia. Debates and Proceedings of the House of Assembly. December 1967. 
10 Bickerton, 201. 
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commitment to the community, but in the case of Sydney Works, elements in Ottawa 
wanted to limit Ottawa's involvement through state-run enterprise. 11 
Nova Scotia could have let Dosco close the Sydney Works. To prove the social 
cost of closure, the province prepared a report indicating just as many secondary business 
workers would lose their jobs if the steel plant closed. Of these 6,000 or so newly 
unemployed, half would not be able to find employment and would cost Ottawa 
immensely with the Unemployment Insurance fund for a year. Applications to the 
province's welfare system would blossom. Half of the steel plant workers would need to 
be retrained and there would be a mass exit of 2,500 families from the island. 12 With 
such high social costs for an area already experiencing high unemployment, and no 
private investor on the horizon, the provincial government was left to defend the jobs of 
the steel plant workers. 
Luckily for the Province of Nova Scotia, Ottawa agreed to pay two million dollars 
to keep the plant operating to the end of April 1968. In December 1967, the government 
of Ike Smith legislated into being the Sydney Steel Corporation and purchased the assets 
and property from Dosco. Initially valued at $13.5 million, with Ottawa donating two 
million dollars and Devco acquiring the coke ovens, the cost to the province was reduced 
to $4,692,000.13 Expropriation was ruled out so as to ensure a market for Sysco products 
at Dosco's Contrecoeur, Quebec facility. 14 Sysco was given broad powers 
11 Bickerton, 202-203. 
12 Bishop, 79. 
13 Ibid., 83. 
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... to do every act and exercise every power and expend every sum of 
money that he [Governor in Council] considers necessary or incidental to 
continue the operations of Sydney Works for a sufficient time to assess the 
long-term future of Sydney Works; ... 15 
Now that the plant would operate until the long-term future could be assessed, decisions 
had to be made on a clear timeline of provincial operation. The province would have to 
decide if it would move to phase out the plant or modernize it as well as explore private 
sector solutions. 
Under authority of the province, auditors estimated that it would take $60 million 
to modernize the existing operation. Some put the cost as high as $75 million in 1967.16 
Operating costs for Sysco were high, not just on the production side, but also in terms of 
the number of employees required and the cost associated with shipping finished products 
to the central Canadian market.17 The auditors warned that modernization would not 
necessarily bring about the profitable operation of the plant but they did spell out that the 
long-term future of the plant had to be decided as soon as possible.18 Although studies 
14 Bishop, 82. 
15 Nova Scotia, An Act Respecting Sydney Steel Works, The Statutes of Nova Scotia 1967 (Second 
Session) and 1968 (Halifax, Nova Scotia: Queen' s Printer, 1968), 3. 
16 Rev. Andrew Hogan, "The Sydney Steel Crisis," a Teach In at King 's University, Halifax, Nova 
Scotia, 23 November 1967. 
17 Bishop, 86. 
18 Ibid., 88. 
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would be carried out, action for the long-term would wait until 1973 under the Liberal 
government of Gerald Regan. 19 
4.3 Profits and Losses 
Dosco bosses were adamant about closing the plant. In front of the Law 
Amendments Committee of the House, Opposition Leader Gerald Regan asked why 
Dosco had not asked the province to buy the plant. Parent owner Hawker-Siddley's chief 
council Arthur Pattilo retorted, "We had to make an economic decision and we made 
it."20 Dosco President T.J. Emmert was asked why they had not requested further 
government aid. His response, "I have no stomach for operating industry this way."21 
Questioning on the operating losses incurred at the Sydney Steel Works under Dosco 
resulted in Emmert responding, "We do not reveal the financial reports of separate 
components within our company."22 
Despite what Hawker-Siddeley or Dosco management may have stated, the steel 
plant made $1 ,660,000 in 1966. What forced the steel plant into the red was a 
$2,500,000 management fee imposed on the operation by Dosco ' s parent company, 
Hawker-Siddeley.Z3 To ensure the early profitability of Sysco, management consciously 
19 Bickerton, 251. 
20 Paul MacEwan, Miners and Steelworkers, Labour in Cape Breton (Toronto: Samuel Stevens 
Hakkert and Company, 1976), 349. 
21 Ibid. 
22 1bid. 
23 Rev. Andrew Hogan, "The Sydney Steel Crisis," a Teach In at King 's University, Halifax, Nova 
Scotia, 23 November 1967. 
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decided to maximize production and profits at the expense of the plant's assets.24 To 
assist in the profitability of the plant, municipal taxes for the city of Sydney were placed 
on a five-year, declining agreement. The steel workers also agreed to continue working 
under their old contract until 1972, thereby providing cheap labour and a production 
record with over a million tons of steel in 1969.25 Devco was subsidizing Sysco by 
operating the coke ovens and supplying coke to the steel plant below production cost.26 
This was combined with an upswing in the market for steel and an agreement with Sidbec 
to purchase steel for its mill in Quebec. 27 In fact, S ysco made money for the first four 
years of provincial ownership under these hidden subsidies.28 The good times were short 
as there were no long run objectives established, or accountability imposed on the Crown 
Corporation. The government-appointed management was left in complete control of the 
operation.29 Labour strife in 1972 ended the wage subsidization,30 and the sale of the 
coke ovens from Devco to Sysco in 1974 for $10 million added more operating costs.31 
24 Bickerton, 251. 
25 Bishop, 106. 
26 Ibid., 107. 
27 Bickerton, 251. 
28 Bishop, 112. 
29 Ibid., 92. 
30 MacEwan, 350. 
31 The Chronicle-Herald (Halifax), 28 February 2002. 
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4.4 Modernization, Part 1 
Although the intentions for modernization at the Sydney Steel Corporation may 
have been genuine, the first attempt proved to be a fiasco. Sysco management moved to 
close the rod and nail mills in 196932 and attempted to close the bar mill in 1972.33 Such 
actions limited the product line ofSysco, ensuring a drop in revenue and attractiveness to 
any future buyers, if any. 
Premier Smith announced a $94 million, self-financing, modernization plan in 
1970, but action on this plan did not occur until Premier Regan's first term in 1971.34 
The plan omitted the critical replacement of the blast furnaces. 35 In 1972, No. 1 blast 
furnace broke, cutting production in half. Another $50 million was authorized to 
purchase a new blast furnace.36 So began the long march into debt for Sydney Steel with 
high interest payments. 
Despite a provincial modernization plan, Sysco management decided to enact its 
own modernization plan. This meant replacing what was most urgently needed. 37 The 
worst decision was to delay the replacement of the open-hearth furnaces with proven 
basic oxygen furnaces. Sysco's plan meant keeping the old open-hearth furnaces and 
32 Bishop, 96. 
33 Ibid., 101. 
34 Ibid., 114. 
35 Ibid., 115. 
36 Ibid., 111 - 116. 
37 1bid., 118. 
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modifying them for use in an unproven submerged injection technique developed by 
Sysco in 1971.38 Although an initial cost saver, this move bought time before the open-
hearth furnaces had to be replaced, thereby increasing the cost down the road. The Sysco 
plan also saw the installation of continuous casting equipment, an oxygen plant, and 
vacuum degaussing equipment. Unfortunately, this equipment was obsolete without 
oxygen furnaces. 39 Monies allocated towards the oxygen furnaces had been spent instead 
on repairs to other equipment and training of personnel. Mismanagement reigned and 
accountability did not exist. Throughout this, sales were dropping, not because of 
markets, but due to a lack ofproduction.40 
It would not be until 1973 that a study into the future of steel making in the 
province would be conducted.41 Given that the first modernization had failed, this study 
by Davy Ashmore recommended a two-phase approach to modernization, costing a total 
of$715 million.42 Sysco could not raise such a large amount of money. All heads turned 
to Halifax for financing, which in tum, looked to Ottawa. The proposed solution was a 
Department of Regional Economic Expansion mega-project known as Cansteel. A new 
modem steel plant would be build in Cape Breton on a new site with deep-water port 
access and designed to produce four million tons of semi-finished steel for international 
38 Ibid., 120. 
39 Ibid. , 121. 
40 Ibid., 125. 
41 Bickerton, 251. 
42 Bishop, 126. 
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export. This was based on predictions of a worldwide expanding steel market. 43 Cracks 
in the plan soon surfaced, however, with a life expectancy on Sysco put at five years in 
1975, and eight years to first production from Cansteel. A downturn in the market for 
steel also occurred, thereby ending all talks on Cansteel, and renewing calls for 
investment into Sysco.44 
4.5 Modernization, Part 2 
The election of Progressive Conservative Premier John Buchanan in 1978 
breathed new life into Sysco. By this time, Sysco was losing $1 million a week and one 
of two things was going to close the plant: equipment failure or financial ruin. 45 Over 
$100 million was being covered by operating grants from the province since 1975 to this 
point.46 An early agreement in 1977 between DREE and the Nova Scotia government 
provided $19.5 million for Sysco, but according to Sysco President of the day, Tom Kent, 
this was a delay or holding action at best.47 Three new studies were conducted on Sysco 
and all three dissented on a plan of action. Some wanted the complete conversion to the 
oxygen furnaces; others wanted to convert to an electric arc furnace. 
43 Bickerton, 252. 
44 Bishop, 132. 
45 Bickerton, 295. 
46 Bishop, 133. 
47 Bickerton, 296. 
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The oxygen furnace strategy would employ the most people and prove to be the 
most costly. It would require coke from the coke ovens that, at this time, had an 
estimated five-year life span.48 The first signs of serious environmental hazard with the 
coke ovens and tar ponds also emerged in this period.49 
The electric arc furnace would mean downsizing from 3,000 to 900 workers, the 
end of the notorious coke ovens, and a smaller but manageable production of steel. In 
effect, Sysco would become a mini-mill ready for sale to an investor. The electric arc 
furnace meant Sysco would no longer be a means of economic development, but a tool 
for the protection of industry in Cape Breton. 50 
The 1980 federal election campaign had the federal parties on side and ready to 
invest in Sysco. Meanwhile, the wrangling continued with cabinet and bureaucrats at 
both levels on the proper plan of action. The $350 million oxygen furnace and 
modernization plan went ahead as the wrangling continued. Added on to this was a $40 
million blast furnace. 51 Sysco had the equipment for an integrated steel works, but was 
only producing railway rails for the Canadian National Railways and Third World 
customers with only 1,200 employees. 
48 The Chronicle-Herald (Halifax), 28 February 2002. 
49 The Chronicle-Herald (Halifax), 28 February 2002. 
50 Bickerton, 296 - 297. 
51 Bickerton, 297. 
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4.6 Last Chance for Hope 
The next part of the Sysco saga occurs in 1987 with the decision to abandon 
integrated steel-making and go with an electric arc furnace "mini-mill" fueled by scrap 
steel. Within two years, the coke ovens and the open-hearth oxygen furnaces were 
closed. By this point, Sysco had cut so many products from its operation in its search for 
profitability, that it was essentially a specialist in the production of railway rails. Only 
700 workers were employed at this point (Appendix G shows the employment levels 
from 1967 to 2000). 52 Finally modernized, but radically downsized, 22 years after 
acquiring the operation, Premier John Buchanan decided to write offSysco's $785 
million debt. 53 
Before long, private investors came to Nova Scotia looking to buy Sysco. The 
Japanese had been sizing it up, as had Kholberg and Co. in New York. A deal was 
reached with the Chinese firm Minmetals in 1993 to jointly operate the plant, and assume 
operation of Sysco in the fall of 1997. Minmetals pulled out of the deal to purchase in 
1996. Talks continued with Minmetals through 1997, but to no avail. Then the Mexican 
Grupo Acerero Del Norte came looking to buy Sysco. By this time, Liberal Premier John 
Savage had paid off an additional $279 million in Sysco debt to make the mill more 
52 David Johnson, "Industrial Policy and the 'New Economy' : Cape Breton Confronts an 
Uncertain Future," Proceedings of the Cape Breton in Transition Conference, October 20-21, 1995, 3. 
53 The Chronicle-Herald (Halifax), 28 February 2002. 
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attractive. 54 A memorandum of understanding with the Mexicans was signed, but this 
deal fell through later in 1998.55 
In 1999, Progressive Conservative Leader John Hamm vowed to close Sydney 
Steel if a buyer was not found before the end of 1999. In a provincial election later that 
summer, Hamm' s Conservatives replaced the Liberal minority government of Russell 
MacLellan, forming a majority government (and reducing the Liberals to third party 
status in Nova Scotia). The only constituency on Cape Breton Island to elect a 
Conservative was in rural western Cape Breton, far removed from the Sysco fiasco. 56 
A new attempt to purchase Sysco came from an Ohio firm called Reserve Group. 
However, once Reserve Group saw the finances, it declared Sysco was nowhere near 
break even and cancelled plans to visit in October of 1999.57 The next potential buyer 
was to be Rail Associates from Michigan. They expressed an interest around New Year's 
Eve 1999. The Conservatives continued the operation ofSysco into 2000, despite a 
promise to the contrary. 58 When the deal with Rail Associates failed, the Swiss finn 
Duferco came calling. Just when a deal seemed imminent, a pension dispute with labour 
at Sysco ruffled feathers at Duferco. 59 Then the world market price for steel took a 
54 The Chronicle-Herald (Halifax), 12 July 1998. 
55 A list of funding announcements and elections is contained in Appendix F. 
56 Election Statistics: Elections from Confederation and on [statistics on-line]; Available from 
http://www.gov.ns.ca/elo/elections/ele summary.pdf; Internet: accessed 5 December 2001. 
57 The Chronicle-Herald (Halifax), 1 November 1999. 
58 Canadian Press Newswire, 4 January 2000. 
59 The Chronicle-Herald (Halifax), 31 January 2001. 
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nosedive, and a deal for cheap electricity from NS Power did not materialize. 60 Duferco 
called off the deal in January of2001.61 Despite all these problems with trying to sell 
Sysco, other firms continued to show interest in the mill. 
Premier Hamm had had enough ofSysco by now. Already a year overdue in his 
promise, orders to commence the liquidation went out. The slow death ofSysco was 
finally complete with 200 workers let go in April2001.62 The steel plant continued to be 
in liquidation as of May 2003 with steel making equipment still for sale and much of the 
plant reduced to rubble. The total costs to the taxpayers for the 34-year Crown 
Corporation has been estimated at over 3.2 billion dollars. 63 
4. 7 Conclusion 
The publically-owned Sydney Steel Corporation, much like Devco, picked up the 
pieces left by metropolis capitalists who drained the hinterland of capital, exploited the 
local labour force, and failed to re-invest in the industrial infrastructure. Initially Sysco 
repeated this pattern in a short-term bid for profitability, draining capital at the expense of 
the plant's assets by running the plant into the ground. Sysco then ended value-added 
production lines, further limiting the potential of the steel-making operation. While 
Sysco was contracting, steel production was expanding in the country at Contrecoeur, 
Quebec and Hamilton, Ontario. Hence, as anticipated by neo-Marxist theory, wealth and 
60 Canadian Press Newswire, 3 April 2001. 
61 Halifax Daily News, 1 March 2001. 
62 Parker Barss-Donham, "Sysco plant euthanasia overdue." Canadian Dimension 35, no. 2 
(March/April2001): 7. 
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poverty were co-existing in Canada, with growing wealth in the metropolis (at other steel 
plant locations) and increasing poverty in the hinterland (at Sysco). In addition, the 
geographical location of the steel plant posed further challenges for Sysco in the form of 
distance to the central Canadian market. Economic development, in this case, relied 
directly and heavily on state intervention, through Sysco. Ali subsequent attempts to 
engage the intervening variable, the private sector, failed. 
Sysco never fostered real economic development in Cape Breton after it was 
acquired in 1967, despite hopes it would act as a growth pole by generating related 
industrial activity. Rather, Sysco raised hope in the community that government would 
solve the steel plant woes (a political objective of the use of Crown Corporations). In 
retrospect, Sysco represents a cancer that attracted available development money from 
both levels of government and provided false hope for the citizens of Cape Breton. Were 
this money spent on core development infrastructure like schools, highways, and 
entrepreneurial developJ?ent, the long-term impact would have been dramatically 
different. 
The Sysco balance sheet does not lie, and prospective buyers noted Sysco's non-
viability; hence, the numerous failed attempts to attract a buyer. The exploitation of 
labour and the thirty years of uncertainty about the plant bred a suspicious labour 
movement, further complicating the sale of the plant. Much like the coal industry, a 
labourist culture had developed at the steel plant that takes a generation shift to change. 
63 The Chronicle-Herald (Halifax), 12 July 1998. 
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Blatant mismanagement and a lack of accountability were the hallmarks of early 
Sysco management. The 1980s choice on modernization using the oxygen furnace 
indicates the perversion of good sound business decisions with political and bureaucratic 
agendas to save jobs. Nine years after the oxygen furnace decision, the furnace was 
closed in favour of a different technology employing a much smaller workforce. 
Political considerations got in the way of good business and economic 
development practices at Sysco. With this in mind, and $3.2 billion later, Sysco is a 
prime example of what not to do when trying to restructure an economy dependent upon 
a declining industry. 
62 
Chapter 5 Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation 
5.1 Introduction 
The rise of the federal Progressive Conservative government of Brian Mulroney 
meant a change in the regional economic development paradigm. Building on the 
experiences gained from past regional economic development experiments, this chapter 
will argue that the Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation (ECBC) has brought about 
significant benefits for the Cape Breton economy. This was done by making a 
commitment to the community, taking a leadership role, and coordinating multiple policy 
instruments in light of the failure of an agency to do so. 
With the arrival of Joe Shannon at the Cape Breton Development Corporation 
(Devco ), a new regional development agency was established in 1985 as an experiment to 
administer two new Department of Regional Industrial Expansion (DRIE) programs: the 
Cape Breton Investment Tax Credit and the Cape Breton Topping-Up Assistance 
program. This agency would be known as Enterprise Cape Breton (ECB). 1 Almost 
immediately, ECB began making the same mistakes that Devco's Industrial Development 
Division (IDD) had made early on: sponsoring footloose industries and fly by night 
operations. 
ECB was an initial step by the new government to solve the economic 
development problem, but changes would soon occur. DRIE was being viewed as an 
1 James Bickerton, "Old Wine into New Bottles? Federal Development Agencies in Cape Breton, 
1984 - 1989," to the Annual Meeting of the 'Atlantic Provinces Political Studies Association ', 20-21 
October 1990, 15-16. Please note, ECB and ECBC are not the same bodies. ECB was an agency with 
ministerial control, ECBC was a Crown Corporation at arms length from the Minister. 
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inefficient, uneconomic organization that overlooked the peripheral provinces and 
concentrated on Ontario and Quebec industrial concerns. This caused the federal 
Progressive Conservative government to dismantle DRIE in favor of the creation of 
regional development agencies in Atlantic Canada and the West. The Atlantic Canada 
Opportunities Agency (ACOA) was established in 1987 with a mandate to stress 
entrepreneurial development. A new Crown Corporation also arrived, Enterprise Cape 
Breton Corporation (ECBC). Reporting to ACOA's President, ECBC would take over 
Devco's IDD and responsibility to promote industrial development on the island, thereby 
broadening the economic base of Cape Breton. ECB would work in cooperation with 
ECBC.2 
The redefinition of Devco as a coal producer and the creation of ECBC to look 
after the industrial development of the island was a contentious issue in Cape Breton. 
Devco bosses and Cape Breton politicians expressed their concern on the issue in front of 
the Parliamentary committee devised to examine the new legislation. The separation of 
the mandates, however, would provide clear definitions of each other's roles and 
responsibilities. 3 ECBC would represent a commitment to the community to diversify 
the economy, and Devco would be a commitment to the community to ensure 
employment in the traditional coal industry continued. 
2 David Johnson, "Industrial Policy and the 'New Economy' : Cape Breton Confronts an Uncertain 
Future," Proceedings of the Cape Breton in Transition Conference, October 20-21, 1995, 7. 
3 Bickerton, 18. 
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5.2 The Difference 
Federal initiatives for region-wide economic development through the 
Department of Regional Economic Expansion (DREE, 1969-1981 ), and later by DRIE 
(1981-1987), were viewed as failures for Atlantic Canada. Over the years, funding was 
often used not to alleviate regional economic disparity, but to prop up Ontario and 
Quebec industry.4 In 1986, Prime Minister Mulroney sought advice from Universite de 
Moncton specialist Donald Savoie on what to do for Atlantic Canadian economic 
development. Savoie advocated the better use of funds and programs through eliminating 
programs that discriminated against Atlantic Canada, assisting small business in the 
region with marketing as well as research and development efforts, and having an 
organization that would not operate in a top-down bureaucratic fashion. 5 The result was 
the creation of the ACOA. To address the Cape Breton's particular economic crisis, 
ECBC was set up, with a mandate 
... to promote and assist, either alone or in conjunction with any person or 
the Government of Canada or of Nova Scotia or any agency of either of 
those governments, the financing and development of industry on Cape 
Breton Island to provide employment outside the coal producing industry 
and to broaden the base of the economy of Cape Breton Island. 6 
Other responsibilities would be added later. Unlike previous Crown Corporations on 
Cape Breton Island (IEL, S ysco, Devco ), decisions on what plan of action to take would 
4 Bickerton, 15-18. 
5 Donald J. Savoie, Rethinking Canada 's Regional Development Policy: An Atlantic Perspective, 
Maritime Series Monographs (Institut canadien de recherche sur le developpement regional I The Canadian 
Institute for Research on Regional Development, 1997), 16-1 7. 
6 Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation Act (R.S. 1985, c.41 (4th Supp.)) . 
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not necessarily come from distantly-located politicians and bureaucrats. There would be 
a role for the local community to play in its own future. 
Mr. Dennis Wallace, former President of ACOA and CEO ofECBC, concurs with 
the assessment of a largely community based strategy with ECBC. ECBC was designed 
such that Cape Bretoners could use the Crown Corporation to mobilize their communities 
in the economic development effort. ECBC also could partner with the Province of Nova 
Scotia on larger strategies. However, with regards to the Nova Scotia offshore oil and 
gas industry, which involves large multinational corporations, ECBC took a top down 
approach in promoting development on the island. One feature of this sectoral strategy 
was ECBC funding for oil and gas training at the University College of Cape Breton. 7 
The ECBC model provides the necessary flexibility and autonomy from political and 
bureaucratic elites to more effectively exploit and capitalize on opportunities for local 
economic development. 
5.3 Growing Pains 
At ACOA's outset, ECB (1985) and ECBC (1987) would report to ACOA. 
Having two separate agencies with similar names and overlapping mandates caused 
confusion among business and the ordinary person. Aside from this, ECB was proving it 
could repeat the regrettable history of regional development in regards to project funding. 
In its first five years of operation, ECB assisted 356 firms to the tune of$200 million. A 
7 Mr. Dennis Wallace, President of the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency and Chief 
Executive Officer of the Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation, interview by author 21 December 2001 , 
Moncton, New Brunswick. 
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study commissioned by the federal government (the Brait Report) found that the best 
project success was among the small-scale initiatives; of 52 large-scale projects, only 
29% succeeded. The Brait Report also criticized the lack of a regional development plan, 
poor management, and questionable decisions. If a silver lining could be found in the 
report, it was the fact 1,800 jobs were created out of a possible 3,700.8 To correct the 
problem with ECB and eliminate the confusion with ECBC, responsibilities for ECB's 
programs were assumed by ECBC in 1991.9 
ECBC had growing pains of its own. The early years of operation saw ECBC 
continue with the promotion and development of staple industries: agriculture, fishery, 
forestry, tourism and crafts. 10 These were ideas imported from the development vision at 
Devco' s IDD dating back to the days ofTom Kent in the 1970s. In 1991 , the federal 
Auditor General criticized ECBC for not paying attention to ACOA guidelines on 
commercial viability assessments and failing to conduct market and feasibility studies on 
proposals. 11 
To make matters worse, the federal government attempted to merge ECBC into 
ACOA and privatize Devco through an Onmibus Bill. This bill would have made 
changes to numerous federal programs that were completely unrelated. Cape Breton 
Liberal Members of Parliament David Dingwall and Russell MacLellan naturally 
8 Johnson, 8. 
9 Johnson, 9. 
10 Johnson, 9. 
11 Johnson, 10. 
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protested this action. When the proposed legislation arrived in the Senate, the two Cape 
Breton Liberal Senators, AI Graham and Allan J. MacEachen, also opposed the bill. It 
would be parts of the bill unrelated to ECBC and Devco that would gamer the necessary 
opposition from the Senators to defeat the bill on a tie vote. 12 
5.4 Employment 
From 1990 to 2001, ECBC estimates that over 6,000 jobs were created in Cape 
Breton through its efforts. 13 When these numbers are compared to Sysco employment at 
given points in time, the figures show that ECBC (if its claims are valid) had a role in 
creating twice as many jobs as Sysco had in 1970, and ten times Sysco's diminished total 
in 1989. In comparison to Devco, ECBC employment initiatives almost equaled 
employment levels at the coal producer in 1968, and about three times the level of 
employment at Devco in 1990 (see Appendix H). 
All development and incentives come at a cost however. Figures obtained from 
ACOA indicate that close to $200 million was allocated by the federal government to 
ECBC over 13 years. Of that, $120 million was spent on assistance to business, making 
the average cost per job created roughly $20,000. 14 The remaining funds went into 
12 Johnson, 11. In the Canadian Senate, votes on legislation that end in a tie are declared defeated 
by the Speaker. 
13 Summary Report, produced for the President of the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency and 
Chief Executive Officer of the Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation, 13 December 200 1. 
14 Summary Report, produced for the President of the Atlantic Canada Opportunities Agency and 
Chief Executive Officer of the Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation, 13 December 2001 . 
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programs to market the island as a place for business and tourism. Infrastructure 
spending in the tourism sector, trade development, and youth initiatives also occurred. 
ECBC continued to be involved with the development of the resource sectors of 
forestry, agriculture, and the fishery. As important as investment and re-development of 
resource industries is, repositioning and attracting new industry to Cape Breton is key to 
the island's economic well being. ECBC has targeted the east coast oil and gas industry 
as a potential new employer for the area. The Sydney area has a large deep-water port 
with easy road and rail access into the Sydport industrial park where the fabrication and 
servicing of oilrigs and ships could easily occur. The port also lies in close proximity to 
the offshore oil and gas deposits in the Laurentian sub-basin and the Sable Offshore 
Natural Gas Project.15 This is coupled with the oil refinery and petrochemical plant at 
Point Tupper, near Port Hawkesbury and the Canso Causeway. 
When a sector-by-sector breakdown is done, employment is greatest in the service 
sector, which currently employs over 70% of the workforce in Cape Breton.16 This 
includes the tourism, culture, and entertainment industry, as well as knowledge-based 
industries. In fact, technical support call centres represent over a third of the new 
employment in Cape Breton fostered by ECBC. 
15 Annual Report, Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation, 1998-1999 
16 Ken Montgomery, Director General of Development, and D.A. Landry, Director of 
Communications & Advisory to the Vice President, Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation, interview by 
author, 18 December 2001, Sydney, Nova Scotia. 
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5.5 Towards a Knowledge-based Economy 
ECBC set out early in its existence to develop local high-tech firms and attract 
others to Cape Breton.17 In the 1970s, Devco was involved in merging the community 
college, a technology institute, and St. Francis Xavier College into the unique education 
and training powerhouse known as the University College of Cape Breton (UCCB). 18 
Building on this heritage, numerous Memorandums of Understanding were signed 
between ECBC and UCCB to encourage growth in the knowledge-based sectors and to 
provide the education and training the highly skilled workers required. Firms now 
partner with UCCB to use laboratories for research and development. The collaboration 
between ECBC and UCCB recognizes that the most important resource for the island is 
an educated and skilled human resource. 19 On the home front, an incubator facility 
known as MEDIAfusion was started with 20 small firms initially, with a steadily 
increasing number of firms joining to develop high tech and multimedia tools for world 
export.20 Two more anchor facilities would join MEDIAfusion in 1999, Silicon Island 
Art and Innovation Centre, and the Technology Enterprise Centre at UCCB.Z1 
17 Annual Report, Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation, 1989, 7. 
18 Tom Kent, The Cape Breton Development Corporation: One Canadian Case of Planning on the 
Spot, in Canadians and Regional Development at Home and in the Third World, ed. Benjamin Higgins and 
Donald Savoie, (Sackville: Tribune Press, 1988), 113. 
19 Annual Report, Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation, 1990-1991, 9. 
20 Annual Report, Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation, 1994, 8-9. 
21 Annual Report, Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation, 1998-1999, 10. 
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ECBC's efforts in developing knowledge industries resulted in the establishment 
of technical support call centers. These large employers provide customer service and 
support for various high tech products worldwide. In March 2000, Prime Minister Jean 
Chretien came to town to announce the opening of an EDS Canada call centre employing 
over 900 people in the Sydney area. Arriving in time to cushion the closure ofDevco' s 
operations, call centres provide a very safe, clean, and healthy work environment when 
compared to the coal mines. EDS would receive close to $13 million in assistance from 
ECBC as well as $8.4 million from the Province of Nova Scotia in the form of payroll 
rebates.22 Some people are concerned, however, about the long-term reliability of 
employment with these multi-national employers. Cape Breton had a negative 
experience with high-tech firms in the 1970s with General Instruments of Canada 
Limited. When government funding expired, and no new money was made available, 
General Instruments of Canada Limited closed shop and moved south of the border.23 
Notwithstanding the skepticism, there is a growing confidence in Cape Breton 
about the long-term future of the area's economy. Once considered a dying town, Glace 
Bay welcomed Stream International Inc. in August of 2001. Employing 900 people at its 
technical support call centre, Stream received $10 million from Human Resource 
Development Canada as well as $2 million24 from the Cape Breton Growth Fund25. 
22 EDS Canada to Create 900 Jobs in Sydney, Nova Scotia [Press Release on-line]; 
available from http://www.ecbc.ca/e/newsreleases/2000033l.asp Internet: accessed 7 April2002. 
23 See Chapter 2 on Industrial Estates Limited. 
24 Stream to Establish 900 Job Centre at Glace Bay (Press Release on-line]; available from 
http://www.ecbc.ca/e/newsreleases/20010810.asp Internet: accessed 7 April 2002. 
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Community confidence grew such that the large supermarket chains Sobeys and Lob laws 
re-invested in the town by renovating and expanding their supermarkets. As well, Port 
Hawkesbury has been the site for another call centre. EDS Canada became the largest 
employer in Cape Breton when it decided to add 600 more jobs to its Cape Breton 
operations, 300 to the Sydney centre, and 300 in Port Hawkesbury, with $13 million in 
assistance from ECBC and the Cape Breton Growth Fund. 26 
5.6 Conclusion 
ECBC, as the policy tool of the government, has taken multiple policy 
instruments and provided success where others have failed. These include tax incentives, 
grants, loans, financial underwriting, program delivery, entrepreneurial assistance, and 
other forms of support. The range of assistance is due to the coupling of ACOA's 
programs and service delivery with ECBC. The other Crown Corporations in this study 
did not even come close to this number of policy instruments at their disposal to foster 
economic development. 
The ECBC experience can be explained in part by the lessons learned at IEL and 
Devco's IDD about businesses that operate in keeping with the metropolis-hinterland 
model. These businesses started operations in Cape Breton only to vacate once the public 
25 The Cape Breton Growth Fund Corporation (CBGF) was established 25 August 2000 to dole 
out $61 million in federal and $12 million in provincial funding to offset the impact of the closure of 
Devco's coal operations. CBGF reports to ECBC. Available on-line: 
http://www. tbs-sct.gc.ca/report/CROWN/0 1 /cc-se-0 1-1 e.html 
72 
subsidies were exhausted. They did not create long lasting stable employment. ECBC 
recognized this kind of parasitic drain on capital and resources and moved to stem the 
outflow by encouraging the development of value-added industries with a wide range of 
policy instruments. ECBC also recognized the need for developing Cape Breton's human 
resources potential and entered into various agreements with UCCB to develop these 
human resources and to provide the critical infrastructure needed for employment 
training, as well as research and development activities. 
Stable, lasting employment is the goal of economic development policy. 
Traditional seasonal industries (fishery, forestry, and agriculture) will continue to play a 
role in the economy, but the tourism and hospitality industry likely will be the major 
player of these former economic mainstays. The oil and gas sector is a long-term 
investment and will take some time to develop. It is also a non-renewable natural 
resource industry and will go the way of coal in the distant future. 
Had knowledge-based industry been targeted earlier, Cape Breton could have 
been further down the road to recovery than it is today. The important point is that the 
potential of this sector and the skilled people it requires has been recognized and the 
industry has been given a footing. The true test of this footing will be if the island can 
recover from the closure of its new, large call centres. The continued partnering of 
UCCB, industry, and government should provide a unique competitive advantage for the 
island in the future. ECBC has made a significant shift in approach to meeting the 
26 EDS Canada Annmmces 600 Jobs [Press Release on-line]; available from 
http://www.ecbc.ca/e/newsreleases/20020314.asp Internet: accessed 7 April2002. 
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challenge of improving the Cape Breton economy, and the results so far amount to at 
least a modest success, with reasonable prospects for further success in the future. 
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Chapter 6 Conclusion 
Throughout this examination, evidence has been presented that demonstrates both 
successes and failures for the use of Crown Corporations in Cape Breton to foster 
economic development. Although all four Crown Corporations produced economic 
benefits for Cape Bretoners, some have been more successful than others in advancing 
the Island's long-term economic future. 
Robert Stanfield's Industrial Estates Limited held much promise for the future. 
Mandated to diversify the economy and reduce unemployment, IEL pandered to the 
capitalists who wished to exploit labour and extract capital, but little was noted in the use 
of staple industries. IEL also attempted to introduce new keystone industries with Cape 
Breton initiatives like Deuterium of Canada Limited (heavy water) and Canadian Motor 
Industries (Toyota), as well as mainland Nova Scotia initiatives like Clairetone 
electronics and Michelin tires. Unfortunately, the industries IEL attracted to Cape Breton 
have since departed or faltered leaving no long-term benefits to the community. Even 
though Cape Breton received more than its fair share of investment funding from IEL, the 
number of start-ups was small compared to smaller population centres like Pictou and 
Lunenburg Counties. With the departure of Frank So bey as President of IEL and the 
election of the Liberals under the leadership of Gerald Regan, IEL shifted to favouring 
home-grown, small and medium sized enterprises as well as entrepreneurship. Although 
this is a sound long-term strategy, voters and politicians would prefer immediate results, 
tied to large employment-creation figures. Lessons were learned from the dangers of 
subsidizing large capital and payroll intensive operations, notably the failed experiments 
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with General Instruments of Canada Ltd. and Deuterium of Canada Ltd. The heavy water 
fiasco also shows the dangers of gambling with the public purse on unproven design 
modifications to a known industrial process. IEL-sponsored development produced 
similar benefits for Cape Breton that other parts of Nova Scotia experienced. Nova 
Scotia's Department of Economic Development has assumed control of Industrial Estates 
Limited's activities. 
The problems with the Cape Breton Development Corporation (Devco) began at 
the start of its operations. The foreign-owned Dosco had exploited the island' s labour 
and resources, and extracted capital from the island with little provision for secondary or 
tertiary industry. The people were marginalized with a severe dependence on the coal 
industry, which fostered a predominantly labourist culture. 
Devco became a symbol to the community and breathed hope into the lives of 
Cape Bretoners. Devco would provide both income stability and the economic 
diversification that was needed. With this mandated social conscience, Devco attempted 
early on to attract large employers with little success and significant financial losses. 
This led to Tom Kent's innovative, home grown, long-term strategy to set Cape Breton 
back on its feet through small business development (such as tourism and crafts), and the 
development of the resource-based staple industries. Meanwhile, Devco's social 
conscience also was evident in the operation of the coal sector. Instead of heading 
towards a phase out by 1981, new mines and employment arrived, keeping at bay the 
unknowns related to the complete shutdown of the industry. The energy crisis, and the 
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need for a secure supply of cheap energy, reinforced the operation of the collieries, 
though at a loss to the taxpayer. 
The change in the federal government in 1984 brought forth a changing policy 
environment. Coupled with the waning of the energy crisis, the gradual phase out of the 
coal industry resumed. Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation was spun out ofDevco's 
Industrial Development Division and subsumed under ACOA in 1988. With Devco left 
as a coal producer, the social conscience mandate could then be shifted to ECBC, which 
took over Devco's economic development role. Profitable years for Devco were ahead in 
the 1990s, but unfortunate geology would erode the profitability of coal operations, 
leading to the final closure ofDevco in 2001, after a long decline in employment. 
Devco' s total cost to the taxpayers of Canada was over $1.5 billion for its 34-year life 
span. 
Sydney Steel would prove to be the most costly and fruitless venture to the 
taxpayers. With no other employment in sight, though there were hopes that Devco 
would eventually solve that problem, Sysco was kept operating to prevent an economic 
catastrophe, and to keep Nova Scotia politicians elected. Sysco was born out of the 
necessity to clean up the mess left by Dosco. Like the coalmines, the steel mill was a 
symbol to the community and contributed to the labourist culture of the island. It was 
intended that Sysco would provide the economic stability and confidence needed during a 
phase out or sale of the steel-making operations. Unfortunately, geographical and global 
market factors were working against the steel plant, coupled with homegrown problems. 
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Profits were made initially by the new Crown Corporation at the physical expense 
of the plant. When modernization was finally forced upon the plant, management 
proceeded by cutting revenue-generating products, and purchasing equipment that could 
not be used. This caused incompatibility of the equipment, breakdowns, delays in 
product delivery, and a loss of profit. Money was tight, but made available at election 
time. In the 1980s, the politicians were still debating jobs versus profitability in a final 
modernization attempt. Employment gradually declined after the closure of the notorious 
coke ovens (which are to blame for much of the pollution in the area) and the conversion 
to an electric arc furnace. Sysco had many courtiers once it was unburdened of its debt 
(by taxpayers) and turned into a primary rail producer, but ultimately no buyers. The 
money kept flowing into Sysco from the provincial coffers until the 1999 election of John 
Harnm who openly ran on a promise to end the ongoing Sysco fiasco. Over 34 years, 
Sysco cost the Nova Scotia taxpayer (and to a lesser extent, the Canadian taxpayer) over 
$3 billion. 
The silver lining in all of these Crown Corporations seems to be Enterprise Cape 
Breton Corporation. ECBC was born out ofDevco's IDD and the start of ACOA, and 
later took on Enterprise Cape Breton's (ECB) responsibilities. Although there were some 
initial growing pains, ECBC pursued a strategy of promoting small and medium sized 
business and continuing to develop the entrepreneurial leadership Cape Breton requires. 
The global high-tech sector and other information industries have been actively sought by 
ECBC as one means of diversifying the island's economy. The petroleum industry has 
been another, though has yet to return substantial benefits. The biggest success has been 
78 
customer service jobs through technical support call centres, now the largest sector of 
employment in Cape Breton. As well, Through various partnering agreements with 
UCCB, ECBC has opened up government facilities for the use of industry in research and 
development. This has created opportunities for Cape Breton's youth to actively train 
and work in Cape Breton. With the decline of the steel and coal industries, human 
resource development has become key to the economic development future, and ECBC is 
providing leadership on that front. ECBC has a greater diversity of resources, more 
flexibility, and less political interference than Devco ever did. As such, ECBC should 
stay the economic development course that it has set and continue to implement the 
policy objective of creating a new, long-term economic base for Cape Breton. Current 
initiatives may be twenty years late in delivery, but it took the phase-out of the old 
resource industries to finally confirm the current path of economic development. 
Brian Crowley of the Atlantic Institute for Market Studies believes the end of 
steel and coal has been the catalyst to tum Cape Breton around. 1 Innovation was being 
stifled by the government funding of steel and coal and the continued false hope ofbetter 
days for theses industries "just around the comer". People are now being forced to make 
their own work. Labour force participation is up 4% since 1993, when there were still 
3,000 people in the collieries. Even though unemployment remains at the high figure of 
17% across the island, the Port Hawkesbury area on the Strait of Canso has an 
unemployment rate of only 2%.2 New construction, a petrochemical facility, an 
1 National Post (Toronto), 8 February 2002. 
2 National Post (Toronto), 8 February 2002. 
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expansion at the pulp and paper mill, and the arrival of new call centre jobs are fueling 
this area's economy. 
Despite the rise in the number of people employed, recent figures indicate that the 
drop in the unemployment numbers may be due in part to out-migration. A Human 
Resources Development Canada Labour Market Review shows that the labour force has 
actually declined by 2,625 people between 1995 and 2000. In 1997-98 alone, 2,021 
people left Cape Breton. The numbers are very high among the youth of the island with 
50% of those under age 25 leaving. 3 
As demonstrated throughout this examination, geographical theories on economic 
development are a factor in Cape Breton on many fronts. Firstly, there is the distance to 
the central Canadian market place and the cost of shipping a global commodity. This 
played an important part in the demise of Sydney Steel. Secondly, there is the staples 
theory. Cape Breton was limited to the fishery, forestry, agriculture, and coal mining; 
staple industries that were tied to Cape Breton's geography and geology. Since these 
industries were declining, Cape Breton fell behind on the economic development front. 
Geology played in heavily on the coal resource, as the coal seams were submarine and 
subterranean making the coal difficult to access. Later on, the coal fell prey to this 
geology, creating an expensive and unsafe work environment, and ultimately ending the 
operation. Thirdly, when growth pole theory was put into practice by the federal 
government, Port Hawkesbury and the Strait of Canso were the only growth poles in 
Cape Breton recognized by Ottawa. The Sydney-Glace Bay area, where most Cape 
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Bretoners lived and worked, was ignored during a time of economic upheaval. Another 
factor of Cape Breton's economic development lies with the culture of the people 
involved. Since the people of Cape Breton were described as lacking entrepreneurship, 
initiative, and resisting change, human resource development strategies had to be 
employed to educate and train the Cape Bretoners for other work and to take on the 
entrepreneurial role of helping themselves. This culture was shaped by the marginalized 
steel and coal workforce, and the labour relations of those industries. 
This leads us to the neo-Marxist theory of economic development. The 
underdevelopment of the island occurred with the exploitation of surplus labour. This 
was noted under Dosco's regime at the collieries and the steel plant. Underdevelopment 
continued with the draining of capital and the failure to add value to the products 
produced. Dosco failed to take the profits and reinvest them into the coal and steel 
operations, running the mines and steel plant down. Similarly, Sysco eliminated its 
value-added production lines in an attempt to save costs on repairs and replacing the 
equipment, thereby cutting its revenue generation. IEL brought General Instruments of 
Canada and Canadian Motor Industries to Cape Breton to take advantage of the surplus 
labour. These firms packed up and left once government subsidization ended. 
When examining the variables defined at the start of this investigation, there is 
definitely more than one way for a Crown Corporation to create economic development 
(see Appendix A). The advantages of Crown Corporations to foster economic 
development depend greatly on the policy instruments granted to it by government. In 
3 Labour Market Review, 2000/2001 Cape Breton Island, Human Resources Development Canada, 3. 
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the case ofECBC, a wide variety of policy instruments were available (taxation, grants, 
programs). This is placed in stark contrast to Sysco, which had very few policy 
instruments (provision of wages) at its disposal. Along the way to the objective of 
economic development, secondary objectives and advantages are realized. Whether these 
advantages are a commitment to the community, separation from the political masters, 
the ability to operate at a loss, or the provision of income stability depends greatly on the 
policy instruments (or lack thereof) given to the development agencies (such as Crown 
Corporations, themselves an "instrument") by government. 
There have been huge sums of money sunk into the failing Cape Breton economy 
over the past 35 years. Simple estimates can put that figure at over $5 billion. One 
benefit has been the preservation of a unique part of Nova Scotia. New businesses have 
come and gone, but some have stayed. Sysco, IEL, and Devco had very limited success, 
whereas ECBC appears to have overcome this historical legacy of policy failures. Sysco 
was the least successful and demonstrates the worst aspects of political interference in 
public enterprise. Devco shows that a Crown Corporation can only do so many things 
and cannot hope to be all things to all people. Imagine trying to phase out the coal 
industry by opening new mines as old mines closed ahead of schedule, while 
simultaneously maximizing employment and developing new employment opportunities, 
with the additional expectation of being profitable. That is a very difficult task to 
accomplish. IEL and ECBC are better examples of how to conduct economic 
development, though IEL's benefits to Cape Breton were far less than Devco' s. Sysco 
and Devco may have been economic development bodies, but their primary legacy was to 
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delay the inevitable for 34 years. The social welfare and votes of those employed (or 
hoping to be employed) were more important than creating a place in the new global 
economy. It must be remembered that there is always going to be some risk in 
developing new industry and business and there will be failures. However, it is 
imperative that development agencies learn from these failures. 
Cape Breton ''bottomed-out" economically in the 1990s, and is now on the climb 
to recovery. The island on the east coast of Canada is no longer the economic basket case 
it was for three decades or more. Cape Bretoners did not abandon the island to a sorry 
fate, though many were driven away to search for new employment. As new 
development initiatives take hold for the information age, new jobs and local 
entrepreneurship are beginning to flourish. The hard experience of the past three decades 
have chastened governments and tempered the people, leaving both better prepared for 
the future. 
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Appendix B 
Table 1.1 -Unemployment Rate Comparison 
Year Cape Breton NS PEl NB NFLO MB Canada 
1966 4.7 5.3 5.8 2.8 3.4 
1967 4.9 5.2 5.9 3.0 3.8 
1968 5.1 5.7 7.1 3.9 4.5 
1969 4.9 6.7 7.4 3.2 4.4 
1970 5.3 6.3 7.3 5.3 5.7 
1971 7.0 6.1 8.4 5.7 6.2 
1972 7.0 7.0 9.2 5.4 6.2 
1973 6.6 7.7 10.0 4.6 5.5 
1974 6.8 7.5 13.0 3.6 5.3 
1975 7.7 8.0 9.8 14.0 4.5 6.9 
1976 9.5 9.6 11 .0 13.3 4.7 7.1 
1977 10.6 9.8 13.2 15.5 5.9 8.1 
1978 10.5 9.8 12.5 16.2 6.5 8.3 
1979 10.1 11.2 11.1 15.1 5.3 7.4 
1980 9.7 10.6 11.0 13.3 5.5 7.5 
1981 10.2 11.2 11 .5 13.9 5.9 7.5 
1982 13.2 12.9 14.0 16.8 8.5 11 .0 
1983 13.2 12.2 14.8 18.3 9.4 11.9 
1984 13.1 12.3 14.9 20.5 8.3 11 .3 
1985 13.8 12.9 15.2 21.3 8.1 10.5 
1986 13.4 13.0 14.4 20.0 7.7 9.6 
1987 19.0 12.0 12.0 13.2 18.1 7.3 8.8 
1988 16.7 10.4 12.7 12.0 16.6 7.6 7.8 
1989 17.8 9.8 13.4 12.0 15.3 7.4 7.5 
1990 16.4 10.5 14.7 12.2 16.9 7.2 8.1 
1991 18.9 12.0 16.8 12.7 18.1 8.6 10.3 
1992 21 .7 13.1 18.2 13.1 19.8 9.1 11 .2 
1993 25.3 14.2 17.7 12.5 18.6 9.4 11 .4 
1994 23.0 13.8 17.5 12.6 20.2 8.8 10.4 
1995 20.4 12.2 15.2 11 .3 18.6 7.2 9.4 
1996 22.7 12.2 14.7 11.5 19.0 6.6 9.6 
1997 19.6 12.3 15.6 12.8 18.9 6.6 9.1 
1998 18.0 10.6 14.0 12.3 18.0 5.5 8.3 
1999 17.5 9.7 14.6 10.4 17.2 5.6 7.6 
2000 17.5 9.2 12.1 10.1 16.5 5.0 6.8 
2001 17.0 10.0 12.3 11.6 16.8 5.1 7.2 
sources: 
HRDC Labour Market Review 2000/2001 
Statistic Canada CANSIM II Tables 279-0007, 279-0003 
Fairley, Bryant, Colin Leys, and James Sacouman, eds. Restructuring 
and Resistance from Atlantic Canada. Toronto: Garamond Press, 
1990, page 88 
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Appendix C 
Table 2.1 -Distribution of IEL Funds 1957-1971 
County Number of Clients IEL Investment (1971 dollars) Per Capita Investment 
actual percent actual percent 
Cape Breton 5 6% $46.3 million 29% 
Pictou 10 13% $34.4 million 22% 
Lunenburg & Queens 8 10% $36.4 million 23% 
Colchester 8 10% $16.7 million 11% 
Halifax 22 29% $13.8 million 9% 
Cumberland 12 16% $4.2 million 3% 
Hants & Kings 5 6% $2.2 million 1% 
Yarmouth & Digby 7 9% $4.7 million 3% 
Total 77 100% $158.6 million 100% 
Note: 
1. The Total Per Capita Investment is based on all counties in the province, including those who 
were not assisted by IEL funds. 
2. The figures for Cape Breton County do not include investments in Victoria, Richmond, and 
Inverness Counties. When Inverness, Richmond, Victoria, and Cape Breton Counties are factored 
together, the Per Capita Investment for Cape Breton Island as a whole becomes significantly lower. 
Source: 
George, Roy E. The Life and Times of Industrial Estates Limited, Institute of Public Affairs, 
Dalhousie University, 1974, page 68 
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$358 
$773 
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$467 
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$31 
$108 
$210 
co 
01 
Appendix D 
Table 2.2 -IEL assisted companies in Cape Breton 
Name Agreement Closed Jobs Money 
(Frank Sobey Era) 
Angel Manufacturing and Supply Company 1960 1999 
General Instruments Limited 1967 1974 
Pyrominerals Limited 1967 1971 
Canadian Motor Industries 1967 1975 
Deuterium of Canada Limited* 1964 1985 
(*figure includes all money invested by both levels of government and IEL) 
sources: 
George, Roy E. The Life and Times of Industrial Estates Limited, 
Institute of Public Affairs, Dalhousie University, 1974, page 93 
Angel, Roger, Director of Angel Manufacturing and Supply Company. 
Interview by author 22 January 2002. 
Fancey, Gary, a former manager with the Cape Breton Development Corporation. 
Interview by author 16 January 2002. 
Manuge, Robert W ., former general manager of Industrial Estates Limited. 
Interview by author 16 January 2002. 
< 50 $66,000 
941 $2,900,000 
< 50 $2,300,000 
170 $1,400,000 
200 $250,000,000 
Location 
North Sydney 
Sydney 
Pt Edward 
Pt Edward 
Glace Bay 
Appendix E 
Table 2.3 - IEL, 20 Years of Deficits 
Year Deficit Covered by Province Jobs IEL Financing 
1967 $1 ,145,200 $1 ,145,200 Years 1958 Years 1958 
1968 $1 ,470,000 $1,470,000 To 1982 To 1982 
1969 N/A N/A 
1970 N/A N/A 
1971 N/A N/A 
1972 $3,120,168 $3,120,168 
1973 $4,450,667 $4,450,667 
1974 $8,708,385 $8,708,385 
1975 $3,396,300 $3,396,300 
1976 $3,129,700 $3,129,700 
1977 $3,047,200 $3,047,200 
1978 $2,743,000 $2,743,000 
1979 $2,863,000 $2,863,000 
1980 $1 ,963,655 $1 ,963,655 
1981 $1 ,378,793 $1 ,378,793 
1982 $1 ,276,900 $1 ,276,900 11000 $270,000,000 
1983 $2,836,464 $570,781 N/A $7,021 ,490 
1984 $9,450,990 $886,665 934 $9,434,700 
1985 $1 ,471 ,981 $1 ,008,188 350 $2,304,624 
1986 $3,703,186 $1 ,740,988 300 $6,361 ,910 
1987 $7,660,774 $1 ,864,342 407 $7,499,000 
Approx Total $63,816,363 $44,763,932 12991 $302,621 '724 
sources: 
The Annual Reports of Industrial Estates Limited 1967-68, 1972-1987 
George, Roy E. The Life and Times of Industrial Estates Limited, 
Institute of Public Affairs, Dalhousie University, 1974 
96 
Appendix E 
......._Deficit 
Figure 2.1 - IEL 20 Year Deficits 
-+--Covered by NS 
$10,000,000 
$9,000,000 
$8,000,000 
$7,000,000 
0 $6,000,000 ... 
.!! 
0 Q 
$5,000,000 r:::: 
.... 
·u 
:; 
Q 
$4,000,000 
$3,000,000 
$2,000,000 
$1,000,000 
$0 
Year "" 
(X) 0> 0 ,... C\1 (") 
""' 
1.() <0 
"" 
(X) 0) 0 ,.... C\1 (") 
""' 
1.() <0 
"" <0 <0 <0 
"" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" "" 
,..... (X) a:> a:> (X) (X) a:> a:> a:> 
0> 0) 0> 0) 0) C1> 0) 0> 0> 0> 0> 0> 0) C1> C1> C1> 0> 0> 0) 0> 0> 
,.... ,.... ,... ,.... ,.... ,.... ,... ,.... ,... ,.... ,.... ,... ,.... ,.... ,... 
.... 
,.... ,... ,... .... 
sources: The Annual Reports of Industrial Estates Limited 1967-68, 1972-1987 
George, Roy E. The Life and Times of Industrial Estates Limited, Institute of Public Affairs, Dalhousie University, 
1974 
Appendix F 
Table 3.1 Devco Facts and Figures 
Loss (Profit) on Conversion Money Spent on Industrial Conversion 
Year Employees Coal Production (2002 dollars) Development Division (2002 dollars) 
1967 6600 -$55,108 -$305,953 $10,415 $57,823 
1968 6278 -$17,100,169 -$91 ,071 ,941 $1 ,195,353 $6,366,201 
1969 4948 -$21 ,935,092 -$112,250,449 $4,828,873 $24,71 1 ,233 
1970 4441 -$25,778,377 -$126,421,457 $3,782,328 $18,549,167 
1971 4263 -$28,830,059 -$139,069,588 $2,090,261 $10,082,939 
1972 4083 -$32,594,705 -$149,276,139 $2,972,334 $13,612,596 
1973 3531 -$31 ,459,028 -$136,129,691 $3,809,819 $16,485,871 
1974 X -$5,954,330 -$23,360,821 $695,750 $2,729,659 
1975 3752 -$29,018,620 -$102,567,315 $5,220,236 $18,451,104 
1976 3780 -$13,995,909 -$45,256,002 $4,883,021 $15,789,329 
1977 3858 -$28,305,759 -$85,206,850 $6,126,848 $18,443,223 
1978 4162 -$11 ,459,526 -$31 ,736,146 $8,493,038 $23,520,719 
1979 4297 -$12,563,739 -$31 ,869,657 $6,455,419 $16,375,061 
1980 4270 -$18,260,488 -$42,391,705 $7,042,970 $16,350,248 
1981 4509 -$10,545,236 -$21 ,736,852 $7,200,156 $14,841 ,653 
1982 -$22,328,383 -$41 ,256,683 $11 ,064,051 $20,443,309 
1983 -$46,518,516 -$80,164,412 $8,218,732 $14,163,174 
1984 3975 -$49,622,754 -$81 ,801,094 $11 ,873,357 $19,572,747 
1985 3495 -$10,032,963 -$15,936,299 $11 ,406,643 $18,1 18,244 
1986 3580 -$16,935,853 -$25,820,595 $6,516,903 $9,935,745 
1987 3651 -$17,685,203 -$25,889,905 $7,239,540 $10,598,1 82 
1988 3435 -$1 ,672,000 -$2,348,382 $6,336,000 $8,899,1 31 
1989 3301 -$29,693,000 -$39,895,732 $6,720,000 $9,029,041 
1990 2983 -$9,396,000 -$11 ,994,677 
1991 2852 $125.000 $150.128 
1992 2554 -$1 ,907,000 -$2,255,818 
1993 2335 $5.898.000 56.846.101 
1994 2279 510,671 ,000 512.361.975 
1995 2203 S10.227.000 S11.596.512 
1996 2091 $5.678.000 56.346.634 
1997 1894 $3,468.000 53,800.592 
1998 1700 -$8,831 ,000 -$9,588,641 
1999 1635 -$29,469,000 -$31 ,675,811 
2000 1312 -$55,624,000 -$58,040,291 
Total Lost: -$551,504,817 -$1 ,524,216,965 $134,182,047 $327' 126,399 
Sources: X = Change in calculating the fiscal year 
Annual Reports, Cape Breton Development Corporation, 1967 to 2000 
Bickerton, James, to the Annual Meeting of the "Atlantic Provinces Political Studies 
Association", 20-21 October 1990, Old Wine into New Bottles? Federal Development 
Agencies in Cape Breton, 1984 - 1989 
Bank of Canada's Inflation calculator 
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/inflation_calc.htm 
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Appendix F 
Figure 3.2- Loss (Profit) on Coal Production (2002 dollars) 
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sources: Annual Reports, Cape Breton Development Corporation, 1967to 2000 
Bank of Canada's Inflation Calculator http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/inflation_calc.htm 
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Figure 3.3 - Money Spent on the Industrial Development Division (2002 
dollars) 
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sources: Annual Reports, Cape Breton Development Corporation, 1967 to 2000; 
Bank of Canada's Inflation Calculator http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/inflation_calc.htm 
...... 
0 
1\) 
Appendix G 
Table 4.1- SYSCO Funding & Announcements in relation to Elections 
Year Original amount 2002 Dollars 
1967 $3,700,000 $20,541,981 
1967 $50,000,000 $277,594,340 
1970 announcement 
1971 announcement 
1972 announcement 
1974 $1,800,000 $7,062,000 
1974 announcement 
1975 $73,000,000 $258,021 ,021 
1975 $11 ,100,000 $39,233,333 
1975 $21 ,400,000 $75,639,039 
1977 $19,500,000 $58,699,488 
1980 announcement 
1981 $80,000,000 $164,903,678 
1981 $20,000,000 $41 ,225,919 
1981 $100,000,000 $206,129,597 
1985 $150,000,000 $238,259,109 
1988 $100,000,000 $140,453,461 
1990 $785,000,000 $1 ,002,109,544 
1991 $130,000,000 $156,132,653 
1992 $25,000,000 $29,572,864 
1993 $279,000,000 $323,849,112 
1996 $85,000,000 $95,009,497 
1997 $25,000,000 $27,397,579 
1998 $100,000,000 $108,579,336 
1999 announcement 
Total Loss (2002 dollars) $3,270,413,553 
sources: 
The Chronicle-Herald (Halifax), 28 February 2002 
The Chronicle-Herald (Halifax), 12 July 1998 
$Source 
Ottawa 
Halifax 
Halifax 
Halifax 
Ottawa 
Halifax 
Halifax/Ottawa 
Halifax 
Ottawa 
Halifax 
Halifax/Ottawa 
Ottawa 
Ottawa 
Halifax 
Halifax 
Halifax 
Halifax 
Halifax 
Halifax 
Halifax 
Halifax 
Halifax 
Halifax 
Halifax 
Halifax 
Party Next Election Information 
Libs Fed 1968 for docks and handling facilites 
Cons Prov 1970 purchase price 
Cons Prov 1970 $94 million offered for modernization 
Libs Minority $94 million re-anounced modernization plan 
Libs Fed 1972 $70 million loan guarantee 
Libs Prov 1974 operating losses 
Libs Fed/Prov 1974 DREE!Halifax CANSTEEL plan 
Libs Prov 1978 auditor general's report on modernization 
Libs Fed 1979 refurbishing 
Libs Prov 1978 refurbishing 
Libs Prov 1978 DREE!Halifax capital works 
All Fed 1980 Federal parties make promises for SYSCO 
Libs Fed 1984 Federal modernization money, phase I 
Cons Prov 1981 Provincial modernization money, phase I 
Cons Prov 1981 assumed operating debt 
Cons Prov 1988 modernization, phase II 
Cons Prov 1988 modernization cost overruns 
Cons Prov 1993 assumed operating debt 
Cons Prov 1993 guaranteed operating line of credit 
Cons Prov 1993 loan against plant 
Libs Prov 1998 operating losses 
Libs Prov 1998 increases to line of credit 
Libs Prov 1998 payment to top up pension fund 
Libs Minority outstanding liabilites, contigent on sale 
Cons Prov 2003? Government moves to close or sell SYSCO 
Bickerton, James P. Nova Scotia, Ottawa, and the Politics of Regional Development. The State 
and Economic Life. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990. 
Bishop, Joan Remple. ''The Sydney Steel Plant, Government Policy and Public Ownership." 
M.A. diss., McGill University, 1984. 
Elections Nova Scotia http://www.gov.ns.ca/elo/elections/index.html 
Bank of Canada Inflation Calculator used to convert dollar figure to 2002 Canadian Dollars 
http://www.bankofcanada.ca/en/inflation_calc.htm 
_. U) 
0 .a 0 w .., 
Appendix H 
4000 
3500 
3000 
2500 
2000 
1500 
1000 
500 
Sources: 
Figure 4.1 - Employment at SVSCO 
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' 
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Projected Jobs 
(Blue, missing data) 
/ 
Johnson, David. 'Industrial Policy and the 'New Economy': Cape Breton Confronts an Uncertain Future. ' Proceedings of the Cape Breton in 
Transition Conference, October 20-21 , 1995; Bishop, Joan Remple. "The Sydney Steel Plant, Government Policy and Public Ownership.· M.A. 
diss., McGill University, 1984. 
Appendix I 
Table 5.1 - Enterprise Cape Breton Corporation Facts and Figures 
Year Appropriation Jobs Created Cost Per Job Contracts Assistance 
1988 $3,420,000 n/a 602 $4,305,109 
1989 $7,300,000 n/a 990 $3,865,615 
1990 $10,560,000 274 $26,652.45 1005 $7,298,178 
1991 $10,400,000 276 $26,652.45 1477 $7,363,946 
1992 $10,050,000 296 $26,652.45 1148 $7,881 ,928 
1993 $9,825,000 269 $26,652.45 985 $7,168,389 
1994 $15,561,900 459 $26,652.45 1510 $12,220,236 
....... 1995 $15,038,000 346 $22,543.50 302 $7,800,050 
0 1996 $14,700,000 308 $30,276.94 387 $9,325,296 +:>-
1997 $9,786,720 376 $15,105.96 401 $5,679,842 (Cape Breton Growth Fund ) 
1998 $8,400,000 135 $38,190.51 75 $5,155,719 
1999 $8,565,720 1428 $12,667.27 37 $18,088,864 Appropriation Jobs Created Cost per Job 
2000 $33,614,000 469 $15,848.28 38 $9,932,845 $15,000,000 235 $10,638 
2001 $39,574,000 167 $19,247.87 27 $14,532,395 $25,000,000 969 $1 1,680 
Totai/Avg $196,795,340 4803 $20,537.95 8984 $120,618,412 $40,000,000 1204 $11,477 
Notes: 
ECBC's Appropriation in 2000 and 2001 also includes the Appropriat ion for CBGF 
1988 figures are for four months 
Contracts and Assistance includes the figures of the CBGF 
Source: 
Summary Report as requested by researcher from the President of ACOA/ECBC, 13 December 2001 
...... 
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Appendix I 
Figure 5.1 - Jobs Created by ECBC 
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Appendix I Figure 5.2 - Employment Comparisons 
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Sources: Summary Report as requested by researcher from the President of ACONECBC, 13 December 2001 ; Annual Reports, Cape Breton 
Development Corporation, 1967 to 2000; Johnson, David. "Industrial Policy and the 'New Economy': Cape Breton Confronts an Uncertain Future." 
Proceedings of the Cape Breton in Transition Conference, October 20-21 , 1995;Bishop, Joan Remple. "The Sydney Steel Plant, GOvernment Policy 
and Public Ownership." M.A. diss., McGill University, 1984. 




